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IQBAL AND INTERPRETATION
KAREN PETROSKI
ABSTRACT
Assessing a year’s worth of debate over the 2009 Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, this Article provides a novel explanation for the decision and presents it as radical
indeed, but in a way previously unremarked by commentators. The sharp divisions in the
responses to Iqbal have masked a deeper consensus and have blocked wide awareness of the
decision’s constructive potential for diverse interest groups. This consensus is based on a
simplified account of the ideal function of pleading in our system of civil litigation, one that
first took hold in the early twentieth century. What unsettles many observers about Iqbal is
its suggestion that district court judges must interpret a civil complaint in order to decide
whether it states a claim. As this Article explains, however, pleading scrutiny always has
involved interpretation; if we find that suggestion troubling, it is only because the vocabulary we have long used to discuss the role and treatment of civil pleadings represses this
fact. The Article describes the ways this vocabulary has shaped the debate over Iqbal and
the contingent historical reasons for its dominance. Looking forward, it shows how Iqbal
makes possible a new agenda for procedural scholarship that draws from work on other
types of legal interpretation, and it suggests some of the specific ways in which this perspective can guide implementation of Iqbal and clarification of its requirements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As soon as it was issued in May 2009, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal1 was hailed as a potential watershed in American
Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Matthew T.
Bodie, Miriam Cherry, Kevin Emerson Collins, Chad Flanders, Katherine Florey, Leah
Chan Grinvald, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Samuel Jordan, Catherine Mackie, David
Marcus, Marcia McCormick, Efthimios Parasidis, Jeff Redding, Adam Rosenzweig, Ann
Scarlett, Anders Walker, and participants at the Washington University Regional Junior
Faculty Works-in-Progress Workshop for comments and suggestions and to Drew Howk,
Erin McGowan, and Darius Miller for research assistance.
1. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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civil procedure.2 On its face, Iqbal offered a clarification of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which applies
to most complaints presenting civil claims in federal court. As a result, many have expected the decision to have profound systemic
effects.3 But observers are deeply divided over what these effects
might be, as well as over their desirability.4 Some commentators, too,
maintain that expectations of a system-wide shift are unfounded.5
2. See, e.g., Andrew F. Halaby, Pleading Analysis Under Iqbal: Once More Unto the
Breach!, 46 ARIZ. ATT’Y 34, 34 (2009) (referring to Iqbal in the preface as a “watershed
decision”); Jess Bravin, New Look at Election Spending Looms in September, WALL ST. J.,
July 1, 2009, at A4 (quoting Tom Goldstein, founder of SCOTUSblog, as stating that Iqbal
will “be the most cited Supreme Court case in a decade”); see also infra Part II, especially
notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American
Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 118 (2009) (stating the Court’s analysis in Iqbal is, “in
certain types of cases, an invitation to ‘cognitive illiberalism’ ”); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Closing the Courthouse Doors: Transcript of the 2010 Honorable James R. Browning
Distinguished Lecture in Law, 71 MONT. L. REV. 285, 291 (2010) (describing the Iqbal
standard as “mean[ing] . . . that it all depends on the luck of the draw and who your
district judge is”); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 832 (2010) (describing Iqbal as “altering a defining feature
of the legal system”); Cassidy M. Flake, Case Note, Ashcroft in a Defendant’s Wonderland:
Redefined Pleading Standards in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 61 MERCER L. REV. 977, 992 (2010)
(“[Iqbal] has the potential to confuse the traditional roles of judge and jury, result in the
dismissal of many meritorious claims, and undermine the civil process of discovery.”);
Halaby, supra note 2, at 38 (concluding that under Iqbal, “federal court plaintiffs and
defendants seem destined to rejoin battle” on issues debated by “long-departed legions of
lawyers whose skirmishes . . . taught us to fight our procedural battles elsewhere”);
Goutam U. Jois, Pearson, Iqbal, and Procedural Judicial Activism, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
901, 901 (2010) (describing Iqbal, with Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), as a
“game changer[]” that “is fairly well known” as likely to “significantly curtail the
availability of remedies in civil litigation”); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in
Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 368 (2010) (citing Iqbal as example of
skeptical and efficiency-focused “restrictive ethos in procedure [that] appears ascendant
and poised for dominance”); John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal: The Latest Retreat from
Notice Pleading, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 60-61 (2009) (concluding that “real problem”
with Iqbal is that standard “will not produce uniform results”); Rakesh N. Kilaru,
Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 905, 908 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal gives “district court judges the most powerful
case management tool of all—a broader authority to simply dismiss a case outright”); see
also discussion infra Part II.B, especially notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
4. Some expect the standard announced in Iqbal to foreclose certain classes of
plaintiffs from civil relief. See, e.g., Jois, supra note 3, at 901; David Marcus, The Past,
Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
371, 426 (2010); Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the
Illusory Promise of Equity, 78 UMKC L. REV. 931, 940 (2010); Melodee C. Rhodes, The
Battle Lines of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and the Effects on a Pro Se Litigant’s
Inability to Survive a Motion to Dismiss, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 527, 529 (2010) (arguing
that under Iqbal, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) “violates an individual’s
procedural due process rights by requiring a pleading standard that a layperson finds
difficult to satisfy”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 517, 519 (2010); Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179,
192 (2010) (“Iqbal ha[s] left the requirements for pleading intentional employmentdiscrimination claims in disarray . . . .”); Darwinder S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and Now
Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims
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Agreeing that Iqbal is significant, this Article argues that a major
aspect of its importance lies in its reintroduction into procedural doctrine of the insight that the scrutiny of civil complaints is (always) a
matter of textual interpretation. Understanding Iqbal in this way
dramatically realigns the debate. It supplies an entirely new way to
understand why Iqbal was decided as it was, as well as some of the
apparently inconsistent responses to the case. Only a few commentators have noted the tie between the type of analysis described by
Iqbal and practices of textual interpretation. Almost without exception, these commentators have labeled the implication distressing.6
What commentators have been reluctant to address is that their
assessments of the decision, across partisan lines, are all based on a
long-dominant cluster of narratives about the development and function
of pleading in civil litigation and the nature of legal interpretation.7
These narratives provide the current vocabulary for discussion of
pleading. For complex historical reasons, the limitations of these
narratives have remained invisible for several generations. When the
narratives’ origins and drawbacks are recognized, Iqbal looks different: not necessarily a disaster, but the potential beginning of a new
and productive era for procedural scholarship and doctrine.
I support this claim in a three-part discussion. Part I below outlines the controversy over Iqbal, describing the key Supreme Court
decisions that preceded it and reviewing the wide range of academic
and popular responses to the decision. These responses have been
divided not just in their evaluations of Iqbal, but also in their explanations of why the Court decided the case as it did. Part II traces the
of Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 419, 423 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal “may be one of the
most infamous and harmful [decisions] to . . . individual rights of this generation”);
Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting
the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 390-91 (2010).
Others consider the chief flaw of the decision to be its introduction of unpredictability
into the process of pretrial disposition of claims of all types. See infra notes 51-52 and
accompanying text. Still others, granting these possible effects, argue that costs flowing
from them are outweighed by the positive reforms effected by Iqbal. See, e.g., Jayne S.
Ressler, Plausibly Pleading Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 627, 632 (2009)
(arguing that the plausibility standard offers “an excellent solution to the problem of
inefficient and costly personal jurisdiction determinations”); Victor E. Schwartz &
Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The
Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107,
1110 (2010) (arguing that change in pleading standards was needed); Douglas G. Smith,
The Evolution of a New Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 88 OR. L. REV. 1053, 1055
(2009) (arguing that Iqbal “recognize[s] that, as the costs of litigation increase and the
scope of discovery expands, the need for more stringent pleading standards increases”);
Richard J. Pocker, Why the Iqbal and Twombly Decisions Are Steps in the Right Direction,
57 FED. LAW., May 2010, at 38, 38 (arguing that Iqbal is not inconsistent with prior
practice); see also infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
5. For representatives of this “agnostic” position, see infra notes 53-54 and
accompanying text.
6. See infra Part II.A.3, especially notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part II.

420

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:417

common source of these diverse perspectives on Iqbal (as well as of
the Iqbal decisions themselves): a historical-legal narrative, internalized
by legal academics and many judges, and providing the dominant
vocabulary for contemporary discussions of pleading. This narrative
and vocabulary date from the first third of the twentieth century;
they depend on the premise that in order to be fair, efficient, and
rational, civil pleading practices cannot be focused on the text of
complaints. This premise was originally, and self-consciously, developed as part of a pragmatic approach to procedure. Indeed, early
twentieth-century philosophical pragmatism influenced this legal
framing of the function of civil complaints. But the version of pragmatism that shaped this legal narrative was a simplification of the
original pragmatist vision, which had sought to develop an innovative
vocabulary for the analysis of issues of meaning and interpretation.
As pragmatism was adopted by nonphilosophical audiences, the philosophy lost this focus. In the process, it became difficult for those
describing the function of pleading to acknowledge that trial court
judges assessing the sufficiency of pleadings continued to treat these
materials much as they treated other legally significant texts, even
though earlier visions of pleading and procedure had recognized this
connection. Together, these developments made it all but inevitable
that something like Iqbal would come along eventually—and ensured
that any such development would be difficult to accommodate within
the prevailing vocabulary for discussing civil pleadings.
Part III considers some aspects of the new agenda that Iqbal
makes possible when considered from this perspective. Iqbal is troubling to many because it seems to propose standards for the evaluation of civil complaints that are both formalistic and indeterminate.
Commentators seeking to explain how to implement these standards
have already turned to other areas of doctrine for models.8 This Part
argues that some of the best resources for focusing discussion of how
to implement these standards may be found in the doctrine developed
to guide various aspects of legal interpretation. Consideration of the
Iqbal “conclusoriness” standard, for example, might usefully draw on
the conception of default rules as information-forcing devices in contract
law and on linguistic canons of statutory interpretation; implementation of the “plausibility” standard could productively be informed by
the extensive work done to study a partly analogous doctrine con8. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 473, 474-75 (2010) (recommending recourse to rules permitting discovery
management); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two
Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1217, 1226 (2008) (recommending recourse to summary judgment and removal
doctrines); Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil
Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1451, 1455 (2010) (outlining parallels to doctrines for
adjudicating motions for judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment).
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cerning administrative agency interpretations of statutes. Moving
our understanding of civil pleading in this direction would assuage
concerns about the subjectivity of pleading scrutiny by allowing judges
to tie their determinations of pleading sufficiency to established
standards. It would also restore an important, and unnecessarily
overlooked, dimension to our vocabulary for discussing civil pleading
and civil procedure more generally.
II. THE IQBAL CONTROVERSY
Most of the controversy about Iqbal concerns the relationship of
the decision to prior law, especially prior Supreme Court decisions.
This Part outlines this legal background, then briefly describes the
decision itself, and finally summarizes the positions commentators
have taken on the wisdom of Iqbal and the reasons for the decision.
It clarifies the main fault lines dividing responses to the decision,
and it shows how these divisions seem irreconcilable within the
prevailing vocabulary.
A. What Happened?
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became law in 1938, creating
for the first time a uniform set of procedural directives for all United
States federal trial courts. Rule 8 addresses the pleading of claims
and defenses. Section (a)(2) of that Rule, unchanged since its original
promulgation, provides that a party presenting a claim must, to state
it successfully, offer “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”9
The Supreme Court first addressed the requirements of this Rule
twenty years later in its 1957 Conley v. Gibson10 decision. Conley
arose from a suit filed by a group of African-American railroad union
members against their union, which had failed to represent them after their employer abolished the plaintiffs’ positions and replaced the
plaintiffs with white employees.11 The union defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint on two grounds: exclusive jurisdiction of the
dispute belonged with the National Railroad Adjustment Board, and
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The lower courts approved dismissal on the first ground,
but not on the ground of the complaint’s insufficiency.12 The Supreme
Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Black, held that the
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). On post-1938 attempts to revise Rule 8, see Amber A. Pelot,
Case Note, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: Mere Adjustment or Stringent New
Requirement in Pleading?, 59 MERCER L. REV. 1371, 1375 (2008).
10. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). On the details of the Conley case, see Emily Sherwin, The
Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73 (2008).
11. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43.
12. Id. at 43-44.
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complaint indicated that the core of the plaintiffs’ claims was not a
dispute over their collective bargaining agreement (an issue that
would have been within the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction) but an allegation of racial discrimination (an issue that would not be),13 and
further that the complaint could not have been properly dismissed on
the alternative pleading ground, since it had “adequately set forth a
claim upon which relief could be granted” under the “accepted rule
that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”14 The
Conley plaintiffs had alleged that the union had protected white
employees but not the plaintiffs, so they had alleged events that, if
proven, would constitute a “breach of the Union’s statutory duty to
represent . . . without hostile discrimination all of the employees in
the bargaining unit.”15 The Court also rejected the argument that the
complaint was deficient because it “failed to set forth specific facts to
support its general allegations of discrimination”16:
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to
set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. . . . [A]ll
the Rules require is “a short and plain statement of the claim” that
will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms
appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such simplified
“notice pleading” is made possible by the liberal opportunity for
discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the
Rules to . . . define more narrowly the disputed facts and
issues. . . . The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is
a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to
the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading
is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.17

In the fifty years following this decision, courts quoted and relied on
its “no set of facts” language more than 10,000 times18 and cited Conley
itself more than 40,000 times, making it the fourth most-cited Supreme Court case in American legal history by 2009.19

13. Id. at 44-45.
14. Id. at 45-46 (citing Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 108 F.2d 302 (8th
Cir. 1940)).
15. Id. at 46.
16. Id. at 47.
17. Id. at 47-48 (footnotes omitted).
18. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007).
19. See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1357-60
(2010) (providing table of 100 most-cited Supreme Court opinions “of all time”). As of
March 17, 2010, Twombly had become the seventh most-cited case. Id. at 1357. It was the
most-cited Supreme Court case between June 30, 2009, and March 17, 2010; during this
period, Iqbal was the fourth most-cited case. Id. at 1360.
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During this same half century, as a series of commentators noted
starting in the 1990s, the lower federal courts’ adherence to Conley
was not uniform.20 In certain kinds of actions, these courts appeared
to demand more of complaints than Conley had. Responding to such
observations, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the scope of Conley in a
2002 decision, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.21 Akos Swierkiewicz, a
reinsurance underwriter, had been demoted after six years of employment and replaced by a man decades younger and with far less
experience.22 In his complaint, Swierkiewicz alleged that his employer’s actions had violated federal law prohibiting discrimination on
grounds of national origin and age; his complaint was dismissed by
the trial court for failure to “allege[] circumstances that support an
inference of discrimination.”23 The Supreme Court, reversing in a
unanimous decision written by Justice Thomas, characterized the
supporting-circumstances requirement as “an evidentiary standard,
not a pleading requirement”24 and noted the Court’s previous refusal
to import standards for the assessment of evidence into the pleading
phase.25 The opinion also noted that,
[I]mposing the . . . heightened pleading standard in employment
discrimination cases conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must include
only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” . . . This simplified notice pleading
standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment
motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of
unmeritorious claims.26

The Court further noted that nine years earlier it had held that “[a]
requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is a result
that ‘must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules,
and not by judicial interpretation’ ”27 and that “Rule 8(a) establishes
a pleading standard without regard to whether a claim will succeed
on the merits.”28 Swierkiewicz was widely taken to clarify that the
20. See generally, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ.
L. REV. 987(2003); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1665 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1749 (1998); see also Ryan Gist, Note, Transactional Pleading: A Proportional
Approach to Rule 8 in the Wake of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1013,
1015-16, 1025-31.
21. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
22. Id. at 508.
23. Id. at 509.
24. Id. at 510.
25. Id. at 511-12.
26. Id. at 512 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957)).
27. Id. at 15 (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993), which reached a similar conclusion with
respect to civil rights claims against municipal officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
28. Id.
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Conley standard supplied the only acceptable terms for use in analysis
of the sufficiency of civil claims not governed by a rule or statute
requiring more detailed pleading, as well as that a judge’s contemplation of the likelihood of success of the plaintiff’s claim was inappropriate on motions to dismiss.29
It was in light of this relatively recent precedent that the Supreme
Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly30 appeared to
depart markedly from the Court’s established approach to pleading.
The plaintiffs in Twombly were customers of regional telephone companies alleging that larger incumbent long-distance phone service
carriers had violated federal antitrust law by conspiring to price their
services so as to keep smaller competitors out of their respective
markets.31 In a decision written by Justice Souter, which held that
these plaintiffs had not stated a claim for violation of the antitrust
statute, the Court explicitly renounced the fifty-year-old “no set of
facts” language from Conley.32 Justice Souter justified “retirement” of
this phrase largely based on his conclusion that courts and commentators using it had been misinterpreting Conley itself. Both Conley’s
account of Rule 8(a)(2) and later courts’ assumptions about Conley,
he argued, had been unduly narrow.33 According to Justice Souter,
the famous Conley phrase was a gloss of only part of the text of Rule
8(a)(2), which requires not just a “short and plain statement” but also
a “showing” of entitlement to relief. Such a showing, Justice Souter
contended, could not be made “[w]ithout some factual allegation” in a
complaint.34 This observation was the basis for Twombly’s controversial requirement that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

29. See, e.g., Christopher Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002).
30. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
31. Id. at 550-51.
32. Id. at 562-63. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Souter observed that the
Conley “no set of facts” language had “earned its retirement,” id. at 563, after being
“questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough,” id. at 562. For discussions of the
facts of Twombly, see Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to
Dismiss Became (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 72-78
(2007) and Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading
Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 625-36 (2007).
33. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63.
34. Id. at 555 n.3 (“Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see
how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the
nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”). Justice Souter also
argued that absurd consequences would flow from treating the Conley phrase as a freestanding principle: applying a “no set of facts” standard would seem to justify denying
every motion to dismiss, making Rule 12(b)(6) meaningless. See id. at 561-62; see also, e.g.,
Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy Claims,
10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 627, 629 (2008).
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on its face,” or to “nudge [the plaintiff’s] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.”35
Twombly prompted great controversy, much of which will be
summarized shortly. But the scope of its holding was not self-evident.
On the one hand, it explicitly rejected the famous Conley language,
long considered the default standard for pleading federal civil claims.
On the other, some language in Twombly suggested that the “plausible” standard might apply only to complaints asserting antitrust
claims or initiating other types of complex litigation. The Court clarified these matters in Iqbal.
Iqbal arose out of events occurring shortly after the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks; the plaintiffs were noncitizens alleging violations of their federal statutory and constitutional rights during their
detention and imprisonment after September 11.36 The defendants
they named included then-Attorney General John Ashcroft and thenFBI Director Robert Mueller,37 who, the plaintiffs alleged, crafted and
directed discriminatory policies leading to the plaintiffs’ mistreatment.38 Ashcroft and Mueller successfully moved to dismiss the
claims against them in 2005.39
In 2009, in a decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme
Court held that this dismissal had been proper under Twombly. The
Iqbal decision confirmed that Twombly was not limited to particular
types of actions.40 It also elaborated on the implementation of the
Twombly standard, describing a district court judge’s assessment of
the plausibility of a claim as “a context-specific task that requires
the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”41
And it offered some more structured guidelines for analysis of complaints on motions to dismiss:
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.42

35. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
36. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147-49 (2d Cir. 2007).
37. Id. at 147.
38. See, e.g., id. at 175 (“[T]he complaint alleges broadly that Ashcroft and Mueller
were instrumental in adopting the ‘policies and practices challenged here.’ ”).
39. See id. (citing Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 1409, 2005 WL 2375202
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005)).
40. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
41. Id. at 1950.
42. Id.
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While not presented as a mandatory scheme, this two-step framework outlines Justice Kennedy’s approach to analysis of the Iqbal
complaint; the majority opinion first identified certain allegations
referring to Ashcroft and Mueller as “conclusory” and thus to be disregarded43 before concluding that the remaining allegations did not
plausibly support the inference that Ashcroft and Mueller acted
with the required state of mind.44 In this way, the analysis suggested not only that allegations consisting of “conclusions” may not be
assumed to be true, but also that they should be treated as if they do
not appear in the complaint when the court assesses the plausibility
of the plaintiff’s claim.45 Dissenting, Justice Souter, author of the
Twombly majority opinion, contended that the plausibility of a claim
should be assessed based on consideration of the complaint as a
whole; in his view, the majority’s excision of “conclusory” allegations
from the complaint robbed its remaining allegations concerning
Ashcroft and Mueller of significance, and thus misconceived the inferences they supported.46
B. Should This Have Happened?
Twombly and Iqbal have generated a massive volume of commentary.47 Most of the commentary is evaluative, identifying problems
with the legitimacy or predicted implementation of the decisions or,
less often, refuting such criticisms. Assuming the decisions do mark a
significant legal change, some commentary also ventures explanations of the reasons Twombly and Iqbal might have been decided as
they were. This Section focuses on the evaluative commentary on
Iqbal; the next discusses efforts to explain the decision.

43. Id. at 1951. For further discussion of this analysis, see Steinman, supra note 19,
at 1308-10.
44. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52.
45. See also infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text, for a discussion of district
courts’ citation of Iqbal’s equation of plausibility with reasonable inference.
46. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960-61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., sources discussed supra notes 2-8; see also, e.g., Capital Report, Congress
Considers Impact of Iqbal and Twombly Rulings, 46 TRIAL, Feb. 2010, at 10, 10 (“In
December, the full Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing . . . to discuss the impact of
[Twombly and Iqbal]. . . . At the hearing, Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
said the Supreme Court had ‘abandoned’ 50 years of precedent to enact ‘judge-made law,’
potentially denying justice to thousands of Americans.[Professor] Stephen Burbank . . .
cautioned that the court’s misguided decision will lead to a ‘whole new brand of mischief’ in
which trial judges subjectively dismiss complaints.”).
An exhaustive discussion of commentary on Iqbal would be voluminous and soon
obsolete; as of March 6, 2011, Westlaw listed 769 articles citing Iqbal in law reviews and
professional journals. More than half of these articles appear in professional journals, and
many address the implications of the case for particular areas of law, such as employment
discrimination and civil rights, or particular settings, such as bankruptcy proceedings and
state court systems. The discussion in this Part does provide a comprehensive overview of
the commentary treating Twombly and Iqbal in general terms as of the date of drafting.
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In a recent article assessing responses to Iqbal,48 David Noll noted
that criticism of the decision tends to draw on arguments of three
types: (1) a “Catch-22” argument that the decision disadvantages
those plaintiffs least able to offer more factual detail in their pleadings (for example, consumers and victims of civil-rights violations);
(2) a “judicial discretion” argument that the “plausibility” standard
cannot be applied consistently and will lead to judicial abuse; and
(3) an “illegitimacy” argument attacking the propriety of judicial
revision of the Conley standard, especially in light of the Court’s
unanimous position in Swierkiewicz.49 As Noll acknowledges, there is
some overlap among these arguments. The argument that Iqbal
licenses judicial discretion often accompanies the argument that
judges will exercise that discretion to serve their personal visions of
the claims that deserve to be litigated. The argument that the standard contravenes Rule 8(a)(2) may also be cast as an argument about
the permissible bounds of judicial discretion. And the argument that
the decisions are illegitimate sometimes takes the form of an argument that the “plausibility” standard violates Seventh Amendment
limitations on trial judges’ decisionmaking.50 But Noll’s breakdown
accurately captures the general shape of criticism of Twombly and
Iqbal. Before Iqbal was decided, the first two arguments (about the
differential disadvantaging of certain plaintiffs and about subjectivity) appeared to be dominant.51 After Iqbal, the third (the argument
about illegitimacy) has become equally visible.52

48. See David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117 (2010).
49. Id. at 120-21.
50. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards
onto Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2009) (arguing that Iqbal “is
unconstitutional when measured against the traditional . . . interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment”); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 38 (2010) (“[T]he
Iqbal/Twombly standard is unconstitutional.”).
51. See, e.g., Saritha Komatireddy Tice, Recent Developments, A “Plausible”
Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007),
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 827, 838 (2008) (emphasizing “leeway” given to lower
courts and lawyers by Twombly and “uncertainty” it created); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 433 (2008) (arguing that Twombly “will
frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with valid claims to get into court”).
52. For examples of the Catch-22 argument, see Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 291
(describing Iqbal as “the five conservative justices on the Court making it harder for those
with claims to get access to the federal judiciary”), Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering
Access:Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 285
(2009) (reading decisions as “signal[ing] an attenuation of access as a guiding principle”),
Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense of Disentitlement: Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 62 FLA. L. REV. 951, 952 (2010) (arguing that decisions “place plaintiffs in a Catch22”), and Schneider, supra note 4, at 519 (“[T]he greatest impact of this change . . . is the
dismissal of civil rights and employment discrimination cases from federal courts.”).
For examples of the discretion argument, see Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the
Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 535 (2009) [hereinafter Burbank,
General Rules] (describing the standard as “an invitation to the lower courts to make ad
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Noll’s taxonomy helps to make the voluminous commentary on
Iqbal comprehensible. But three other refrains are equally widespread in that commentary. First, many commentators, including
Noll,53 express agnosticism about the likely impact of Twombly and
Iqbal.54 They argue that it is too soon to know whether consequencehoc decisions reflecting buried policy choices”), The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Leading
Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 252, 261 (2009) (“By imposing a probability requirement, the
Court imposed its own view of the most likely explanation for a set of allegations—
performing a role normally reserved for the factfinder—and invited lower courts to do the
same.”), Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 291 (“What is plausible and credible to one district
judge is not going to be plausible and credible to another.”), Clermont & Yeazell, supra note
3, at 832 (criticizing Iqbal for “fix[ing] on a novel and unpredictable test”), Eichhorn,
supra, at 953 (noting “the unbounded discretion that the opinion grants to judges”), Kilaru,
supra note 3, at 919-20 (noting that decisions “give lower courts a tremendous power
that they did not have before”), Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 26 (2010)
(describing “judicial experience and common sense” as “highly ambiguous and subjective
concepts”), Rajiv Mohan, Recent Development, A Retreat from Decision by Rule in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1191, 1196, 1197 (2010)
(describing Iqbal holding as “highly discretionary”), Pardo, supra note 8, at 1466 (referring
to “unprincipled discretion” licensed by decisions), Collyn A. Peddie, Let’s All Play Iqbal, 46
TRIAL, Aug. 2010, at 54, 54 (“[D]efendants and some courts . . . see [in Iqbal] a Darwinian
panacea that gives judges virtually unfettered discretion.”), and Robert L. Rothman,
Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, 35:3 LITIGATION 1, 2 (2009) (“Iqbal has the
potential to short-circuit the adversary process by shutting the doors of federal courthouses
. . . based on what amounts to a district court judge’s effectively irrefutable, subjective
assessment of probable success.”).
For examples of the illegitimacy argument, see Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading
Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 88384 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court “is not in a good position to gather and process”
the information needed to determine the optimal stringency of pleading standards);
Stephen B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of Transsubstantive
Procedure, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1189, 1191-92 (2010) [hereinafter Burbank, Future] (arguing
that Iqbal “ignored the requirements of the Enabling Act and [the Court’s] own prior
decisions”); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 832 (criticizing the Court’s “follow[ing] a
disruptive legal process in . . . altering a defining feature of the litigation system”); Mark
Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should
Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 155 (2009),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf (arguing, in contribution by
Burbank, that decisions cannot be described as interpretations of Rule 8(a)(2)).
53. Noll, supra note 48, at 122, 147, 149 (concluding that “the answer to the question
‘What do we know about the Iqbal model?’ is ‘Not much’ ” and that Iqbal is likely a
“watershed opinion[] whose deep logic only gradually becomes clear and whose language
fails to capture that deep logic”).
54. See, e.g., Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost
of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2010) (noting that “real world”
operation of standard “is poorly understood”); Thomas P. Gressette, Jr., The Heightened
Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal: A New Phase
in American Legal History Begins, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 401, 448 (2010) (noting that
implications of Iqbal remain unclear); John G. McCarthy, An Early Review of Iqbal in the
Circuit Courts, 57 FED. LAW, May 2010, at 36, 36-37 (“Opinions issued by many . . . circuit
courts in which Iqbal is discussed or analyzed arrive at the same result that would have
been reached under prior case law.”); Colin T. Reardon, Pleading in the Information Age, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2170, 2181-82 (2010) (suggesting that cases involving “severe
information[al] asymmetries” may be rarer than many critics contend); Kendall W.
Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
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focused criticisms of the decisions (the possibilities that they might
disadvantage certain classes of plaintiffs and be applied unpredictably) are well-founded. In addition, more than a few critical and
agnostic responses stress not the implications of the decisions in the
abstract, but decisional techniques that litigants and courts might
use to cabin any potential adverse effects.55 The position of these
observers is that Iqbal and Twombly need not make a big difference
in practice, regardless of their implications in theory. And with apparently increasing frequency, some have been arguing that
Twombly and Iqbal are defensible in theory as well as in practice,
either because they represent sound solutions to problems arising
from changes in civil litigation over the past fifty years56 or because
Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) (concluding, based
on a study of district court decisions in the seven months following Twombly, that it
“appears to have had almost no substantive impact,” except in civil rights cases, where the
decisions “show a significant departure” from prior patterns); Michael R. Huston, Note,
Pleading With Congress to Resist the Urge to Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 415, 427 (2010) (arguing that decisions “have not dramatically increased the number
of cases dismissed in federal court for failure to state a claim”).
55. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 52, at 851 (urging consideration of “Twombly’s virtues
without the taint of Iqbal’s vices”); Stephen B. Brown, Reconstructing Pleading: Twombly,
Iqbal, and the Limited Role of the Plausibility Inquiry, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2010)
(“[M]uch of this criticism [of the decisions] is unjustified because it overlooks the analytical
steps that occur before the plausibility inquiry”); Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality
Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2010) (proposing a “plaintiff neutrality principle” for use in
implementing standard); Hartnett, supra note 8, at 474-75 (emphasizing “Twombly’s
connection to prior law and suggest[ing] ways in which it can be tamed”); Suzette M.
Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address
the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 70
(2010) (“[T]rial courts . . . should consider narrow, targeted discovery to determine
plausibility at the pleading stage.”); Seiner, supra note 4, at 181 (offering “an analytical
framework for asserting the essential facts of a Title VII claim”); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (“[T]he . . . defining
principle of contemporary pleading doctrine is the requirement that a complaint . . .
describe events about which there is a presumption of impropriety.”); Allan R. Stein,
Confining Iqbal, 45 TULSA L. REV. 277, 277 (2009) (urging “a limiting construction [of
Iqbal] that may serve to constrain its impact beyond its peculiar context”); Steinman, supra
note 19, at 1298, 1314, 1324-25 (“[T]he primary inquiry at the pleadings phase is not a
claim’s ‘plausibility,’ but rather whether a necessary element of a plaintiff’s claim is alleged
in the form of a ‘mere legal conclusion.’”).
56. See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 8, at 474-75 (suggesting that a “tamed Twombly” is
consistent with “broader trends toward managerial and discretionary judging”); Herrmann,
Beck & Burbank, supra note 52, at 147 (maintaining, in contribution from Herrmann &
Beck, that “given the enormous transaction costs that litigation entails, Type II errors
(false negatives[, disadvantaging plaintiffs with weak but meritorious claims]) are probably
preferable to Type I errors (false positives)”); id. at 157 (arguing that “[t]he discovery
system is, in fact, broken”) (quoting INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (2008), available at
http://druganddevicelaw.net/ACTL%20Discovery%20Report.pdf; Kenneth S. Klein, Is
Ashcroft v. Iqbal the Death (Finally) of the “Historical Test” for Interpreting the Seventh
Amendment?, 88 NEB. L. REV. 467, 468 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal may “be the necessary
impetus to revisit . . . the way we interpret the Seventh Amendment’s preservation of a
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they are more faithful to the original vision of Rule 8(a)(2) and Conley than were intervening decisions such as Swierkiewicz.57 This
perspective casts the decisions as eminently practical and critics as
unduly formalist.
Noll also does not seek to explain—or to describe how others have
explained—the reasons Twombly and Iqbal might have been decided
as they were. Such explanations are often implicit in particular criticisms or defenses of the decisions, most of which are based on particular normative visions of judicial decisionmaking. For example, a
conclusion that Iqbal is problematic because it disadvantages information-poor plaintiffs can fit well with an account of Iqbal as more or
right to a jury trial”); Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton,
Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2010) (“In hindsight . . ., removing
the issue-narrowing function [of the common-law system] from pleadings has proven to be
a serious mistake. . . . [A] move to fact-based pleading need not upset the general structure
and values of the existing pretrial process.”); Ressler, supra note 4, at 632 (contending that
“Twombly[] . . . offers an excellent solution to the problem of inefficient and costly personal
jurisdiction determinations”); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 4, at 1110 (concluding that
broadnotice pleading has “rightfully ‘earned its retirement’” and that state courts should
follow plausibility standard); Smith, supra note 4, at 1055 (arguing that Iqbal “is likely to
increase the efficiency and fairness of modern civil practice”); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Refocusing Away from Rules Reform and Devoting More Attention to the Deciders, 87 DENV.
U. L. REV. 335, 340-42 (2010) (arguing that before decisions, district court judges “regularly
err[ed] in deciding Rule 12 dismissal motions,” often “giv[ing] credence to incredibly weak
legal arguments and factual assertions”); Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,”
87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 407-08 (2010) (noting “deep flaws” of the pre-Twombly regime).
57. See, e.g., Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews
v. Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010) (arguing that the Twombly
decision was “not revolutionary, but simply part of the Court’s ever-expanding application
of the familiar three-factor Mathews v. Eldridge test”); Scott Dodson, Comparative
Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 455 (2010) (“America may be
moving toward the global norm by experimenting with more rigorous fact pleading and
dispensing with mere notice pleading.”); Herrmann, Beck & Burbank, supra note 52, at 146
(arguing, in contribution from Herrmann & Beck, that decisions “are right on the law,”
since “the better-reasoned decisions did not credit [“labels,” “conclusions,” and “formulaic
recitations”] even under Conley”); Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the
Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 143, 144 (2010) (arguing that both sets of
decisions “are best viewed as lag indicators (albeit imperfect ones) of what had been going
on in the lower courts for years”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L.
REV. 999, 1005 (2010) (“Iqbal . . . lays bare both the fact that pleading doctrine is a form of
‘choice architecture’ and that the materials used to build that architecture [legal doctrine
and language] are seriously, and ineluctably, deficient.”); Pardo, supra note 8, at 1485
(concluding that decisions are consistent with proposed “unified theory of civil litigation,”
implicit in prior doctrine and practice); Pocker, supra note 4, at 38 (“[I]t is hard to see how
the analysis now required is any more subjective or capable of prolonging dubious litigation
than was the Conley v. Gibson process.”); Smith, supra note 4, at 1055 (arguing that Iqbal
is “consistent with the text of Rule 8, giving effect to the language that in the past had
often lain dormant”); Spencer, supra note 55, at 5 (“[B]y bringing fact pleading out of the
shadows . . ., the Supreme Court has made it possible . . . to discuss pleading doctrine
without having to contend with the pesky contradictions between . . . high-minded rhetoric
about notice pleading and the reality on the ground of particularized pleading.”); Adam
McDonnell Moline, Comment, Nineteenth-Century-Principles for Twenty-First-Century
Pleading, 60 EMORY L.J. 159, 163 (2010) (arguing that decisions “mark a return to the
original meaning of the Rules”).
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less consciously intended to disadvantage exactly those plaintiffs.
Articulating a similar point before Iqbal was decided, Lonny Hoffman
has suggested that commentators’ ideological commitments to particular visions of procedural reform drive their descriptions of the
significance of pleading doctrine.58 But as the next Section suggests,
this explanation of commentators’ disagreements is not completely
satisfying, given that commentators themselves tend to explain the
emergence of the new pleading standards in an analogous way.
C. Why Did This Happen?
Why did the Court decide Iqbal as it did? As this Section will detail,
most of the explanations advanced to date rest on a legal realistinfluenced assumption that the decision was to some extent pretextual. Some focus on the extraordinary nature of the dispute at
issue in the case. Most, however, explain Iqbal as a stealth reform of
the civil litigation system, intended to achieve systemic goals not discussed in the decision itself.
More than a few observers have suggested that the sensational
facts in Iqbal’s case might have swamped the Justices’ consideration
of the broader implications of their decision. On this account, the majority Justices were blinded to the technical implications of the case
by their biases against Javaid Iqbal, a noncitizen, and in favor of
Ashcroft and Mueller, as well as by a reluctance to second-guess
high-level executive national security decisions.59 While the hot-

58. Hoffman described a basic ideological split among commentators on pleading
reform that remains valid after Iqbal. Some commentators are “Traditionalists,” holding
“that robust efforts to regulate [litigation] at the pleading stage are wrongheaded and
inconsistent with the traditional pleading standard” expressed in Conley; others are
“Reformists,” who “favor . . . an expanded judicial role” in regulating civil litigation and
whose approach appears to be reflected in Twombly. Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1225. See
also Robert D. Owen & Travis Mock, The Plausibility of Pleadings After Twombly and
Iqbal, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 181, 181 (2010) (noting emphasis of commentary on “broad
range of theories and narratives, which often appear to be shaped by the authors’ preexisting beliefs about the proper role of pleadings in federal civil litigation”).
Noll does not explore in depth the reasons for the Iqbal decision. See, e.g., Noll, supra
note 48, at 132 (arguing that the “open texture” of Iqbal is “the product of a number of
factors, some . . . inherent in the project of laying down general standards, . . . others . . .
linked to how the Court reintroduced factual screening into federal practice”).
59. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 217,
218-19 (2010) (focusing on how Iqbal “puts the imprimatur of the Supreme Court on a
particular narrative of the excesses carried out by the Bush Administration in the name of
fighting terrorism”); Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 225, 227 (2009) (“Iqbal illustrates one side of the relationship between national
security case law and the larger domain of public law: Emergencies are opportunities for
sweeping doctrinal and functional changes affecting many subject matters.”); Sidhu, supra
note 4, at 423 (arguing that Iqbal “may be one of the most infamous and harmful [opinions]
to American jurisprudence and individual rights of this generation”); Stein, supra note 55,
at 277 (arguing that Iqbal “lends itself to a much narrower construction,” based on “[t]he
substantive law controlling the defendants’ immunity”).
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button nature of the dispute surely had some relation to the Court’s
decision to review it and to the Justices’ attitudes toward Iqbal’s
complaint, this explanation seems too simple, since it requires us to
assume that these aspects of the case entirely overcame the Justices’
ordinary conceptions of their roles.
Others explain the decision as a pretext not for the exercise of
animus against noncitizens or solicitude for executive-branch officials, but for sweeping reform of the civil litigation system. Some
commentary thus explains the Twombly and Iqbal decisions as motivated by a desire to deter suits by “outsider” parties presumed more
likely to initiate harassing litigation, be they consumers (as in
Twombly), aliens (as in Iqbal), or putative victims of civil-rights
violations (as in Iqbal and Swierkiewicz). This explanation also assumes that the Justices’ biases drive their legal reasoning, but it
views that bias as one favoring “insider” parties like government
entities, large corporations, and defendants in general, while disfavoring “outsider” parties. It often accompanies critiques of Iqbal on
grounds of illegitimacy and the creation of a Catch-22 for plaintiffs.60
Other commentary explains the decisions not as driven by animus
per se but as efforts to disguise broad procedural reform—aimed
especially at reducing the costs of civil discovery—as a modest readjustment of pleading standards.61 This argument, however, is in some
60. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 875-77 (2009) (describing Twombly as focused on “prevent[ing]
undesirable lawsuits from entering the court system”); Scott Dodson, Essay, Pleading
Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. (IN BRIEF) 135, 138 (2007)
(suggesting that Twombly was motivated by goal of “[s]afeguarding defendants from
meritless strike suits”); Helen Gunnarsson, Iqbal: A “Dangerous” Tightening of Federal
Pleading Standards?, 97 ILL. B.J. 602, 602 (2009) (“Professor Stephen B. Burbank . . . was
quoted in The New York Times as saying Iqbal is ‘a blank check for federal judges to get
rid of cases they disfavor.’ ”); Jois, supra note 3, at 901 (describing Iqbal as exemplifying
“the invention of procedural rules to significantly curtail the availability of remedies in
civil litigation”); Marcus, supra note 4, at 412 (suggesting that decisions “bespeak hostility
to the underlying substantive claims”); Miller, supra note 52, at 53 (describing decisions as
“motivated in significant part by a desire to develop a stronger role for motions to dismiss
to filter out a hypothesized excess of meritless litigation, to deter allegedly abusive
practices, and to contain costs”); Schneider, supra note 4, at 518 (arguing that decisions are
attributable in part to “widespread and generalized ‘hostility to litigation’ ” at every level of
the federal judiciary); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive
Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 197 (2010) (“[T]he Iqbal majority’s new fact
skepticism . . . derives from, and gives voice to, what appears to be the institutional biases
of the Justices, as elite insiders.”); Steinman, supra note 19, at 1299 (noting that decisions
“appear to be result-oriented decisions designed to terminate . . . lawsuits that struck the
majorities as undesirable”); Tice, supra note 51, at 827 (noting that Twombly “signals a
growing hostility toward litigation”); Bravin, supra note 2, at A8 (quoting Richard Samp of
the Washington Legal Foundation as stating that the Court decided Iqbal as it did because
it “is sort of fed up with excesses in the tort system and is looking for ways to try to
eliminate frivolous lawsuits”).
61. See, e.g., Blair-Stanek, supra note 57, at 1 (arguing that Twombly was “part of the
Court’s ever-expanding application of the familiar three-factor Mathews v. Eldridge test”
to discovery costs); Miller, supra note 52, at 53 (describing decisions as “motivated . . . by a
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tension with criticism of the Twombly/Iqbal standard as licensing
boundless discretion, since the Justices have no way to ensure that
district court judges will share their visions of the appropriate direction
of reform.62 Overall, the realist vision of the decisions as pretextual
attributes to judges ignorance of the very phenomenon that is so obvious to commentators; although there is surely some truth in such
explanations, they are less than fully satisfying. Even some of the
explanations acknowledging that Iqbal and Twombly must have
stemmed from more complex motivations attribute the details of the
standard to a regrettable judicial habit of clothing motivations in
neutral doctrinal garb63 or to hubris resulting from the Justices’ inexperience with trial court-level decisionmaking.64
A few explanations decline to take this realist approach. They cast
Twombly and Iqbal as relatively straightforward responses to changes
in federal civil litigation.65 The rest of this Article considers a distinct
desire to develop a stronger role for motions to dismiss to . . . contain costs”); Reardon,
supra note 54, at 2178 (noting that “[p]lausibility pleading” “arose out of” concerns with
discovery costs); Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate:
‘Twixt the Cup and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 227 (2010) (noting that decisions were
driven “in part[ by] a concern that discovery is so expensive and burdensome that
pleadings must be found sufficient before discovery is allowed to begin”); Smith, supra note
4, at 1055 (arguing that Iqbal marks a “recogni[tion] that, as the costs of litigation increase
and the scope of discovery expands, the need for more stringent pleading standards
increases”); Subrin, supra note 4, at 390 (characterizing standards as motivated partly by
“[t]he expense of discovery in federal court”).
62. Cf. McCarthy, supra note 54, at 37 (“After eight months . . ., it appears that[] in
most circuits the Iqbal decision will not change the result reached in most cases.”).
63. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 51, at 468 (“Perhaps by ridiculing the statement in
Conley as some crazy old relative that had long been viewed derisively by most members of
the family, the Court was able to conceal the magnitude of what it was doing . . . and to get
away with not making any effort to articulate the compelling justification ordinarily
required for departures from stare decisis.”); see also Edward Brunet, The Substantive
Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 14 (2010) (arguing that
Court’s use of “plausible” term was “misguided and only continues to confuse what is
already a less than clear standard”); Burbank, General Rules, supra note 52, at 535
(arguing that the Supreme Court should “forthrightly require fact pleading as a matter of
substantive federal common law”); Eichhorn, supra note 52, at 953 (“[B]y drawing on a
metaphor of judging-as-measuring, the Court invests its new plausibility test with the
appearance of objective consistency, and in so doing, deflects attention from the unbounded
discretion that the opinion grants to judges who will administer that test from now on in
the lower courts.”).
64. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanaugh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 882-89 (2008) (arguing that Twombly showed
Court to be “out of touch with the judicial system that it is charged with managing”);
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 850 (arguing that the “opinions . . . smack more of
confusion than of political motivation”); Miller, supra note 57, at 1006 (arguing that Iqbal
“seems largely uninformed by psychological evidence detailing the way in which human
beings—including judges—assess likelihoods”); Reinert, supra note 4, at 946 (arguing that
Iqbal evinced “the Court’s profound mistrust of lower courts’ ability to use their case
management power to balance concerns like qualified immunity and abusive discovery,”
thus representing “a shift in power within the judiciary”).
65. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 57, at 144 (arguing that decisions “are best viewed as
lag indicators (albeit imperfect ones) of what had been going on in the lower courts for
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and novel explanation for the decisions, one that also declines to
attribute to the Justices motivations that are not apparent from the
Iqbal opinions themselves. The Justices deciding Iqbal, when faced
with the question of the significance to be attached to the allegations
in Iqbal’s complaint, honestly struggled with that question and cast
their answers in terms indicating that they saw their struggles as
involving interpretation of the complaint as a text. The Justices’ differing conclusions were, to be sure, colored by their presuppositions
about human behavior both in and outside the civil litigation system,
but those conclusions were also colored by the Justices’ divergent
understandings of the practice of textual interpretation. The Justices
did not clearly describe the problem in these terms, however. They
did not do so for the same reason that commentators, even when recognizing that the decision involved and licensed a kind of textual
interpretation, have been reluctant to pursue the implications of this
observation. The Justices and commentators alike have grown up
within, and had their vocabularies shaped by, a procedural vision
that represses the role that textual interpretation plays in the early
stages of civil litigation.
III. PRAGMATISM AND INTERPRETATION IN PROCEDURAL DOCTRINE
The view of Twombly and Iqbal advanced here is in some respects
counterintuitive. Accepting it requires a critical perspective on a
powerful legal-historical narrative that most academic commentators
and many judges embrace and endorse: what this Article calls the
standard story of pleading. The origins of this narrative lie in the
adoption of a particular philosophical and social vision—the pragmatic
vision—by those responsible for shaping the federal civil legal system
in the United States during the first several decades of the twentieth
century. When this vision was taken up by lawyers and particularly
by proceduralists, important aspects of its originator’s thought had
already been repressed—specifically, a concern with the analysis of
meaning (including, but not limited to, the special case of verbal
meaning). Because today’s neo-pragmatism and legal pragmatism
descend from this simplified pragmatic vision, they too look very little
like pragmatism in its earliest form. That richer pragmatic vision
holds much of value, as is shown by subsequent work drawing on it in
other legal areas. In particular, it supports a thicker, more accurate
description of many of our common experiences, including our experiences with legal communication and norm development. As this Part
shows, Iqbal is a natural, if not exactly predictable, result of all of
these developments. Many judges have long implicitly recognized the
years”); Moline, supra note 57, at 163 (arguing that decisions “mark a return to the original
meaning of the Rules”).
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role of interpretation in screening pleadings, but neither judges, litigants, nor commentators have had access to a vocabulary for expressing that recognition. This conceptual impoverishment breeds unnecessary discomfort with the notion that judges’ activity with respect to
complaints might most accurately be conceived as interpretive.
A. The Return of Pragmatism’s Repressed
Fleshing out the sketch offered in the previous paragraph, this
Section considers, first, the standard story of pleading that is now so
widely accepted as legally authoritative, then the simplification of
pragmatism that occurred around the time this story was formulated
and that shaped later understandings of procedure and legal interpretation, and finally the ways this simplification has affected the
doctrine and commentary discussed in Part I.
1. The Standard Story of Pleading
A chief architect of the standard story of pleading was Judge
Charles E. Clark, who was the drafter of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and, as such, was responsible for the account of prior
pleading regimes presupposed by the pleading portion of those
Rules.66 In his writing on this topic, Clark split the history of pleading practices into three phases, progressing from common-law or “issue” pleading through nineteenth-century code or “fact” pleading and
culminating in the more practical “notice” pleading that Clark championed in the early twentieth century. In Clark’s description, the
progression through these phases involved a gradually decreasing
“emphasis . . . [on] the pleading stage of the trial,” in accordance with
what Clark presented as a natural tendency of maturing legal systems.67 It is only a slight overstatement to say that this story has
been universally accepted by subsequent proceduralists.68
Clark was critical of the first chapter in his story, that of commonlaw pleading. In early modern England, where this regime developed,

66. On Clark’s contribution to the drafting of the Federal Rules, see especially David
Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of
Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433, 448-501 (2010); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 961-73 (1987). Marcus provides a comprehensive bibliography of
Clark’s writings on civil procedure, including pleading topics (on which Clark wrote a great
deal), at Marcus, supra, at 435 n.1, and concludes that Clark would have found Iqbal “an
anathema,” id. at 507. This Article agrees but provides a slightly different explanation of
why. Its account of Clark’s narrative draws heavily on CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (2d ed. 1947).
67. CLARK, supra note 66, at 12 (noting a parallel between tendency in Roman law
to reduce emphasis on pleadings over time and similar tendency in Anglo-American
legal systems).
68. See infra Part III.A.3, especially notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
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a plaintiff hoping to initiate a civil action had to “procure[] a writ”
from the chancery clerks; the writs available were limited to a specific,
fixed set of “forms of action” that grew only slowly and haphazardly
to accommodate new kinds of disputes.69 Once a writ had been obtained, the issues for decision by the court were identified through a
back-and-forth exchange of further pleading documents that placed a
premium on esoteric drafting skills.70 The fatal flaws of common-law
pleading, according to Clark, were its extreme formalism and the
substantive injustices this formalism engendered.71 In Clark’s account,
the formal meaninglessness of common-law pleadings was the flipside of their functional excess of significance for the litigation process
(although Clark did not cast his critique of the process explicitly in
terms of “meaning”).
Clark was less dismissive of code or fact pleading, the second
chapter in his story. The mid-nineteenth-century New York civil
procedure code that supplied the prototype for this regime72 absorbed
the more free-form regime of equity pleading favored by Clark73 and
replaced claim-specific pleading requirements with the general requirement that every civil complaint contain just a statement of the
facts constituting the cause of action.74 But as courts began to use
this statutory language to explain their conclusions about the sufficiency of particular pleadings, the standard’s apparent simplicity
broke down. Trial court judges reached different conclusions about
whether identical allegations were “statements of fact,” as required
69. CLARK, supra note 66, at 14-15.
70. Thus, Clark wrote,
the common-law system was limited in the extent of the relief which it could
grant and the manner of granting it to the arbitrary units comprising the forms
of action. Coupled with this were the refinements enforced to induce the
production of an issue [for trial], resulting in a highly technical system which
afforded none too complete relief.
Id. at 15.
71. Echoes of Clark’s assessment of common-law pleading as formalist appear
throughout recent commentary. See, e.g., Jason G. Gottesman, Comment, Speculating as to
the Plausible: Pleading Practice After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 17 WIDENER L.J. 973,
976 (2008) (“Pleading in [the common-law] system was full of dangerous pitfalls for
careless lawyers. The formalistic and repetitious requirements created a situation where
the slightest error in pleading would cause the dismissal of the action.”); Hannon, supra
note 54, at 1812 (explaining that “[a]t its early common law stage, pleading in the United
States was formalistic to the point of ‘subordinat[ing] substance to form’”).
72. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 66, at 23-31; see also Gunther A. Weiss, The
Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435, 506
(2000) (explaining that by 1897, thirty-one states had enacted civil procedure codes
modeled on the New York code).
73. CLARK, supra note 66, at 16-17, 32-33.
74. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform:
Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 520 (1957) (“[The] New York Code of
1848 sought only simple truthful statements of the facts showing that there was a cause
of action.”).
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by the code standard, or “evidentiary facts” or “conclusions of law,”
which some courts prohibited.75 Courts also reached different conclusions about the nature of a “cause of action,” and this was the aspect
of the debate that most engaged Clark.76 His relative lack of interest
in the “statement of facts” debate is revealing, since that debate, as
conducted by academic commentators of the era, directly concerned
verbal meaning and interpretation.77 One side of the “statement of
facts” controversy urged that the difference between facts and legal
conclusions was purely conventional, a matter of judicial habits of
classifying more general allegations as legal and more particular
ones as factual,78 based on judges’ exposure to prior similar classifications.79 The other side of the debate insisted on an essential “logical”
distinction between factual allegations and legal contentions, the latter
containing technical legal language, the former only everyday or
“common language.”80 Both sides agreed, however, that understanding pleading requirements required understanding the mechanics of
verbal communication and comprehension.81 For both sides, analyzing the sufficiency of pleadings required a self-conscious focus on the
language used in the allegations in a complaint.82
As mentioned above, Clark mostly steered clear of this debate.83
Preferring to focus on problems with the concept of a “cause of action,”
75. In particular, see Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the
Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 417 (1921) [hereinafter Cook, 1921], and Walter Wheeler
Cook, ‘Facts’ and ‘Statements of Fact,’ 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233, 233-35 (1936) [hereinafter
Cook, 1936].
76. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 66, at 129-38.
77. The “statement of facts” debate was conducted mainly between Walter Wheeler
Cook, a colleague of Clark’s at Yale, and Bernard Gavit, then dean of the Indiana
University School of Law, who also participated in the “cause of action” debate. See
especially Cook, 1936, supra note 75; Bernard C. Gavit, Legal Conclusions, 16 MINN. L.
REV. 378 (1932).
78. Cook, 1921, supra note 75, at 417 (arguing that there is “no logical distinction”
between statements of fact and conclusions of law).
79. See id. at 420-21; Cook, 1936, supra note 75, at 243-45.
80. Gavit, supra note 77, at 389, 391.
81. Cook developed this theme in greater detail than Gavit did. The articulation of a
claim in a complaint, he argued, occurred at the end of a process of abstraction from the
world of physical stimuli, involving a matching between simplified sense experiences and a
set of linguistic schemata based on the perceiver’s experiences, education, and purposes.
Cook, 1936, supra note 75, at 238-40. A similar process occurred, according to Cook, when a
judge deemed allegations factual or legal. See id.
82. Id. at 236 (insisting that that issues of pleading are linked to issues of the
“meaning of words and how words get their meaning”); Gavit, supra note 77, at 378-87
(discussing ambiguity between common and legal meaning of terms and relationship of
legal form, or vocabulary, to legal substance, or meaning).
83. To be sure, Clark endorsed Cook’s position. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Walter
Wheeler Cook, 38 ILL. L. REV. 341, 343 (1944) (describing Cook’s statement-of-fact articles
as “outstanding”). But in complimenting Cook, Clark also expressed his impatience with
the debate itself, which he considered “trite” and full of “pseudo learning” (albeit not in
Cook’s analysis). Id. It is not entirely clear that Clark cared to grapple with the details of
Cook’s position in this debate. See also infra note 84. Thanks to David Marcus for bringing
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Clark urged courts, litigants, and commentators not to focus on the
abstract essence of such causes of action—as common-law pleading had
done with the analogous forms of action—but to focus on the function
of pleading in general as a vehicle for furthering “trial convenience”84:
This . . . is avowedly a flexible and loose definition of the term
[“cause of action”]. No ready yardstick is offered a court; but,
except where aided by previous precedents, it is forced to use its
discretion, having in mind the purposes to be subserved. This is
frankly placing the matter in the hands of the judge and seems
much preferable to the seeming exactness of many definitions
which turns out to be mere delusion. It seems better to compel a
court to support its decision on procedural points by arguments
based on practical trial conditions than upon arbitrary formal
distinctions read haphazardly into vague phrases.85

The last sentence of this passage makes especially clear how Clark’s
critique of fact pleading, unlike the “statement of facts” debate,
deemphasized attention to details of communicative form. In general,
Clark seemed frustrated by debates over textual meaning, preferring
to think of the judge’s task at the pleading stage as a matter of discretionary consideration of the “facts” asserted by the plaintiff (the
express or implied referents of the plaintiff’s allegations), not of the
plaintiff’s specific verbal presentation of those facts (the language in
the complaint).86
This distaste for thinking of pleadings as texts deeply affected
subsequent accounts of pleading. It is evident, for example, in the
Federal Rules’ approach to pleading. The Rules represented Clark’s
solution to the problems of the code pleading regime and marked the
beginning of the third chapter in his story: the notice pleading era.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, governing pleadings, contains no
reference to “statements of facts” and thus made irrelevant debates
over the nature of complaint language of the kinds summarized
above. Conley also reflected Clark’s vision of the function of complaints and the trial judge’s role in reviewing them: under Conley, at
least in theory, plaintiffs did not need to worry about whether their
allegations were factual, evidentiary, or legal, nor about whether
they identified legally recognized rights in their pleadings.87 The
this article to my attention.
84. CLARK, supra note 66, at 137; see also Clark, supra note 83, at 343 (“[T]he modern
highly successful trend to simplified pleading is built upon Cook’s demonstration that these
abstractions [statements of fact and law] were not absolutes, only at most differences of
degree, which should turn not on formalistic rules, but on the need or convenience of the
business in hand, and the amount of persuasive pressure the pleader desires presently to
apply.”); Bernard Gavit, A “Pragmatic Definition” of the “Cause of Action”?, 82 U. PA. L.
REV. 129 (1933) (criticizing position taken by Clark and others on this point).
85. CLARK, supra note 66, at 138.
86. See, e.g., id. at 129; see also supra note 84.
87. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Steinman, supra note
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Conley standard appeared to reassign the basis for judicial decision
regarding the sufficiency of pleadings from characteristics of the
pleadings as documents to the judge’s assessment of the type of proceeding likely to follow.88 In later work, Clark explicitly endorsed the
standard articulated by the Court in Conley.89
Well before Twombly (and before Swierkiewicz), commentators
recognized that not all federal courts were actually treating complaints in this way.90 In some kinds of cases (as in Swierkiewicz, at
the lower court levels), some courts required plaintiffs to plead in
specific ways in order to survive motions to dismiss.91 But the commentary critical of these practices did not recommend a return to
understanding pleadings as texts in need of structured explication.92
The prevailing position remained the Clark-Conley assumption that
the complaint as a text should function as a transparent window into
more important features of the dispute: that judges should look
through the paper complaint to the events alleged in it, the defendant’s imputed awareness, and the kind of trial proceedings implied by
these facts, and that judges should base decisions about pleading sufficiency on conclusions about such underlying or projected facts, not
on features of the pleading documents.
The skeptical commentators were correct that the Clark-Conley
conception of notice pleading was never an accurate account of what
litigants and courts were actually doing with complaints. But this
was not merely because judges treated complaints differently depending on the substantive law involved, the judges’ preconceptions,
and the inconsistent signals sent by other sources of legal authority,
as the commentators stressed. It was also because, even in simple,
everyday cases, judges (and parties arguing motions to dismiss) did
indeed have to analyze the text of complaints; judges always had to
try to identify the claims presented by plaintiffs in their complaints
and to assess whether the complaints included verbal formulations
directly or indirectly relating to the required components of the identified claims.93 All along, courts were interpreting complaints as well
19, at 1300 (referring to “the liberal approach [to pleading] that governed during the first
several decades of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).
88. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 66, at 481-95.
89. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case”?, 21 F.R.D. 45
(1957), reprinted in PROCEDURE—THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS OF JUDGE CHARLES
E. CLARK 147 (Charles Alan Wright & Harry M. Reasoner eds., 1965).
90. See generally sources cited supra note 20.
91. See, e.g., supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 20, at 1059 (attributing irregular adherence to
Conley to doctrinal confusion and inconsistent messages from Supreme Court); Hazard,
supra note 20, at 1672 (suggesting that more detailed pleading is appealing to litigants for
practical reasons); Marcus, supra note 20, at 1750-52 (similar).
93. Some deny that this kind of analysis occurs. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 20, at
1001; Sherwin, supra note 10, at 75, 84, 94. But most acknowledge that something like it is
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as the law, even though Clark had strongly suggested that this was
unnecessary and counterproductive. The variability of practice under
Conley was a product of this more basic fact as much as it was a
result of headstrong judges’ decisions to single out certain cases for
special treatment.
Yet Clark’s account of the ideal function of pleadings retains a
strong hold on contemporary understanding of the issue. Clark’s
three-part history remains the standard framework for the history of
pleading in all American civil procedure casebooks and virtually all
law review articles on procedure.94 This history is explicitly teleological. It presents the passage from code to notice pleading as an unqualified improvement, and a key aspect of that improvement is the
renunciation of any concern with the form of pleadings. Clark himself
identified as “pragmatic[]”95 this focus on pleading as “a means to an
end,” rather than “an end in itself.”96 The next Section explores why
he might have chosen this label for his conception of pleading and
how this choice is related to his insistence that the form of complaints is irrelevant to their sufficiency.
2. The Simplification of Pragmatism
Clark’s distaste for questions of verbal meaning was not just a
personal quirk. It was part and parcel of his self-identification as
“pragmatic.” Specifically, it was a corollary of the way in which philosophical pragmatism was popularized in the first few decades of the
twentieth century, as pragmatism became not just a school of philosophical thought but a cultural phenomenon.97 One result of this
development is that it is relatively uncontroversial to claim that most
American legal professionals and academics are now pragmatists in
inevitable. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 60, at 882 (noting that even most liberal pleading
standard requires a complaint to “offer some reason to believe that the story it tells is
linked to the elements of a legal claim”); Charles B. Campbell, A “Plausible” Showing After
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 22-28 (2008); Huffman, supra note 34, at
636-37, 639, 652; Ides, supra note 32, at 606-07, 610.
94. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC
COURSE 1057-64, 1097-1141 (9th ed. 2007); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING
AND P ROCEDURE: S TATE AND FEDERAL C ASES AND MATERIALS 546-647 (9th ed. 2005);
A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL P ROCEDURE : A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 403-506 (2d
ed. 2007); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL P ROCEDURE 333-73 (7th ed. 2008); see also, e.g.,
Schwartz & Appel, supra note 4, at 1108-21; Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil
Trial in the United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 347 (2003); infra notes 133-37 and
accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 66, at 137 (“The extent of the cause is to be
determined pragmatically by the court. . . .”); see also Thurman W. Arnold, The Code
“Cause of Action” Clarified by United States Supreme Court, 19 A.B.A. J. 215 (1933); Gavit,
supra note 84, at 129; Marcus, supra note 66, at 486.
96. CLARK, supra note 66, at 54.
97. See, e.g., David A. Hollinger, The Problem of Pragmatism in American History, 67
J. AM. HIST. 88, 89-91 (1980).
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some sense.98 Moreover, our form of pragmatism is similar to Clark’s,
or at least more similar to his form of pragmatism than to what gave
rise to it. These partly independent developments reinforce the appeal
of Clark’s account of pleading, making it doubly difficult for us to see
how Iqbal represents a kind of return of what pragmatism repressed
as it was popularized.
Standard accounts of philosophical pragmatism trace its origins to
the late nineteenth-century meetings of the Metaphysical Club,
which counted the future Justice Holmes, as well as Charles S. Peirce
(1839-1914) and William James (1842-1910) among its members.99
Although Peirce was the oldest of the classic pragmatists, and the
coinage of the term “pragmatism” is attributed to him,100 his ideas are
probably the most unfamiliar to contemporary lawyers.101 James and
John Dewey (1859-1952) more directly sought to shape pre- and interwar American political and intellectual culture, as well as legal
thought, and succeeded in doing so.102 It is not inaccurate to think of
James and Dewey as developing a coherent tradition begun by
Peirce, but each of these three thinkers had a different focus. Peirce,
98. See, e.g., Justin Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism
in Contemporary Legal Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565, 569-72 (2007); Peter F. Lake,
Posner’s Pragmatist Jurisprudence, 73 NEB. L. REV. 545, 546, 643-44 (1994); Robert S.
Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought—A
Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 861, 862, 873, 946-48 (1981).
99. See, e.g., LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA
201 (2001).
100. See William James, Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results (1898), in
COLLECTED ESSAYS AND REVIEWS 406, 410 (1920); see also, e.g., Morris Dickstein,
Pragmatism Then and Now, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL
THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 1, 1 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998).
101. See, e.g., Hollinger, supra note 97, at 95 (describing Peirce as “the Melville of
American philosophy”). Although Peirce’s influence on legal thought has been indirect,
many of his ideas have been adopted in various areas of law. See, e.g., ROBERTA KEVELSON,
THE LAW AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS (1988) (using Peirce’s semiotic theory to analyze legal
systems); Susan Haack, On Legal Pragmatism: Where Does “The Path of the Law” Lead
Us?, 50 AM. J. JURIS. 71, 79-80, 88 (2005); John R. Josephson, On the Proof Dynamics of
Inference to the Best Explanation, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2001); Note, Holmes, Peirce,
and Legal Pragmatism, 84 YALE L.J. 1123, 1140 (1975) (concluding that Peirce’s direct
influence on Holmes may have been greater than Holmes admitted). Most recently, Kevin
Collins has urged that Peirce’s tripartite semiotic theory supplies the concepts needed to
make sense of the printed matter doctrine in patent law. See Kevin Emerson Collins,
Semiotics 101:Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379 (2010).
102. See, e.g., DAVID L. HILDEBRAND, BEYOND REALISM AND ANTIREALISM: JOHN DEWEY
AND THE NEOPRAGMATISTS, at ix (2003) (focusing on Dewey as representative of classical
pragmatism); JOSEPH MARGOLIS, REINVENTING PRAGMATISM: AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY AT
THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, at x, 1 (2002) (noting centrality of Dewey to
neopragmatism); JOHN P. MURPHY, PRAGMATISM: FROM PEIRCE TO DAVIDSON 39 (Richard
Rorty ed., 1990) (noting that it was James’s 1907 book Pragmatism that “spread
pragmatism around the world”); RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (ESSAYS
1972-1980) 28-29, 46, 63-64 (1982); Robert B. Westbrook, Pragmatism and Democracy:
Reconstructing the Logic of John Dewey’s Faith, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM, supra
note 100, at 128 (noting Dewey’s influence); Dickstein, supra note 100, at 1.
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who worked as a scientist, focused on logic and what he called his
“phaneroscopy,” a vast systematic theory of experience and existence
similar to what would later be called phenomenology.103 James’s
frame of reference, in contrast, was mostly psychological; Dewey’s
was social.104 As James and Dewey adapted Peirce’s ideas to their
own preoccupations for delivery to the wider public, the younger
pragmatists also abandoned important aspects of the conceptual
framework within which Peirce had developed those ideas, particularly his interest in the phenomenon of signification, or meaning.
A good example of this transformation of Peirce’s ideas is the fate
of his “pragmatic maxim,” which Peirce first proposed in an 1878 essay in these terms:
[T]he rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension [of a conception] is as follows: Consider what effects, that
might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object
of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is
the whole of our conception of the object.105

The second and third sentences in this passage are much easier to
understand than the first, which might be incomprehensible to readers not accustomed to Peirce’s writing. The final sentence seems to
counsel us, if we want to understand something, to look at the effects
that thing has (identified as effects by their “practical bearings”).106
This was the stress that James and Dewey placed on the maxim in
their own work,107 and it is very similar to the ideas at the core of
Clark’s vision of pleading and civil litigation more generally.
But this emphasis on outcomes does not fully capture the maxim’s
significance within Peirce’s own work. The maxim “was regarded by
Peirce himself as a . . . rule[] and method for ascertaining the meaning of signs.”108 One of the unfamiliar aspects of the first sentence in
the maxim is its reference to “the third grade of apprehension.” This
reference is characteristic of one of the most basic features of all of
Peirce’s writing, his preoccupation with three-part or triadic analysis
(as opposed to the two-part, dyadic analysis characteristic of philoso103. See, e.g., T.L. SHORT, PEIRCE’S THEORY OF SIGNS 60-66 (2007).
104. See, e.g., H. S. THAYER, MEANING AND ACTION: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF
PRAGMATISM 133, 165 (2d ed.1981).
105. Charles S. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, 12 POP. SCI. MONTHLY 286
(1878), reprinted in 5 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE para. 388, 402
(Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1936) [hereinafter CP].
106. Judge Posner often makes this equation in his work. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 153-54, 162 (1990); Richard A. Posner, The
Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 866 (1988).
107. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
108. THAYER, supra note 104, at 87. See also, e.g., John Dewey, The Pragmatism of Peirce,
13 J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 709, 710 (1916) (“Peirce confined the significance of
the term [pragmatism] to the determination of the meaning of terms, or . . . propositions;
the theory was not, of itself, a theory of the test, or the truth, of propositions.”).
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phers from Plato through Descartes to Kant).109 This obsession sometimes led Peirce astray, but often led him to useful insights, as for
example in his theory of signification, or “semeiotic.”
Peirce’s tripartite theory of signification may be familiar to some
readers from its adoption by later (mostly nonpragmatist) writers.110
Peirce regarded every sign, or meaningful phenomenon, as composed
of three aspects: the sign itself (also called the “representamen” or
“sign-vehicle” by Peirce), the object (akin to the referent of the sign),
and the interpretant (the dimension of the sign’s meaning, akin to
the understanding we have of the relation between sign and object or
to the product of that understanding, however manifested, as for
example by our stepping on the brake pedal when we see a stop
sign).111 Without all three components, Peirce argued, a sign does not
function; signification, or meaning, occurs only when a sign acquires
an interpretant, or is interpreted. Interpretants may be, and often
are, themselves potential sign-vehicles.112 And signs, both as signvehicles and as interpretants, need not be verbal, but can include
other sensory phenomena.113 Although Peirce’s theory of signification
may be understood and usefully applied without acquaintance with
other aspects of his thought, it was not a free-standing theory in his
writing but was, rather, intimately related to his triadic analysis of
what he called the “categories” of experience and being, which he
called firstness, secondness, and thirdness.114 Firstness Peirce identified as the aspect of reality consisting of pure quality, experienced as
a kind of pure possibility (e.g., redness in the abstract).115 He called
secondness the aspect of relation, experienced as constraint or effort
(e.g., the pressure of the brake pedal against our foot when we brake
at a stop sign).116 And thirdness he defined as the aspect of mediation,
experienced as predictable regularity, intelligibility, and meaning
109. See, e.g., SHORT, supra note 103, at 27-90.
110. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 101, at 1408-13; see also generally UMBERTO ECO, A
THEORY OF SEMIOTICS (Thomas A. Sebeok ed., 1976); ROMAN JAKOBSON, ON LANGUAGE
(Linda R. Waugh & Monique Monville-Burston eds., 1990).
111. See, e.g., Charles S. Peirce, Sign, 2 DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
527 (James Mark Baldwin ed., 1902), reprinted in PEIRCE ON SIGNS 239-40 (James Hoopes
ed., 1991).
112. As Peirce’s follower Josiah Royce perceived, this theory implied that
interpretation is an endless process. See generally JOHN E. SMITH, ROYCE’S SOCIAL
INFINITE: THE COMMUNITY OF INTERPRETATION (Archon Books 1969) (1950).
113. See, e.g., SHORT, supra note 103, at 151-206.
114. The literature on Peirce contains many explanations of the categories. For an
introduction, see, for example, SANDRA B. ROSENTHAL, CHARLES PEIRCE’S PRAGMATIC
PLURALISM 77-82 (1994). Peirce maintained that the categories were irreducible, that is,
that thirdness cannot be described fully in terms of qualities (firstness) and relations
(secondness). See, e.g., Charles S. Peirce, A Guess at the Riddle, in PEIRCE ON SIGNS, supra
note 111, at 186, 192-93 (manuscript unpublished during Peirce’s lifetime); SHORT, supra
note 103, at 74.
115. See, e.g., ROSENTHAL, supra note 114, at 77-82.
116. See id.
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(e.g., our perception of the sign as a reason to stop the car).117 Peirce
understood verbal meaning as just one instance of thirdness among
many others, including natural laws and behavioral regularities of
other kinds.118 This understanding explicitly discarded a number of
assumptions basic to common understandings of meaningfulness in
Peirce’s day (and our own), most important among them the notion
that meaning is reducible to communicative intention or, alternatively,
to some state of affairs (a referent) in the world. Both of these correspondence-based conceptions of meaning are dyadic (focusing on the
collapse of sign into intention or referent), and Peirce viewed them as
basically flawed for this reason.119
This sketch of Peirce’s ideas is very abbreviated. One of the important points to take from it is that Peirce saw his theory of signification as related to the most basic features of a broader philosophical
system. As James and Dewey developed Peirce’s ideas for a wider
audience within their own thought, they did not further develop his
account of meaning. Instead, they usually took the phenomenon of
meaning for granted. In fact, in some respects they endorsed accounts of meaning that Peirce had explicitly rejected.120 James, for
example, sometimes embraced the correspondence theory of truth
that Peirce criticized.121 (A correspondence theory of truth, analogous
to a correspondence theory of meaning, holds that a proposition is
true if it carries a meaning that corresponds to or in some way copies
reality; such a theory is dyadic.) Dewey’s instrumentalist conception
of truth as “warranted assertability”122 also coexisted in his work
with a correspondence theory of truth and meaning.123 Yet it was
James’s and Dewey’s versions of pragmatism, and especially Dewey’s
commitments to process, voluntarism, and democracy, that most
directly influenced Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
similar commitments shaped Clark’s understanding of the cause of
action in terms of trial convenience, his reconceptualization of the
functions of pleading in terms of notice and sensibly managed decisions

117. See id.
118. See, e.g., Peirce, supra note 111, at 239-40.
119. See SHORT, supra note 103, at 16-18.
120. See, e.g., THAYER, supra note 104, at 146 (noting that James “apparently had little
interest in enunciating . . . a theory” of meaning, and that while “Peirce undertook to
explicate the idea of meaning[,] James was concerned to explicate the meanings of ideas”).
121. See, e.g., Richard M. Gale, William James’s Semantics of “Truth,” 33
TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y 863, 866-67 (1997); H. S. Thayer, On
William James on Truth, 13 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y 3, 6 (1977).
122. John Dewey, Propositions, Warranted Assertability, and Truth, 38 J. PHIL. 169,
169 (1941).
123. See, e.g., id. at 178-79, 183; H. S. Thayer, Two Theories of Truth: The Relation
Between the Theories of John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, 44 J. PHIL. 516 (1947) (arguing
that Dewey’s conception of truth is basically compatible with Russell’s logical
correspondence theory).
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on the merits, his disregard for the text of complaints, and his concomitant focus on the facts presumed to lie behind that text.124 In this
way, pragmatist approaches to decisionmaking and justification have
come to coexist with correspondence theories of meaning and truth in
mainstream contemporary American legal thought on procedure.
Judge Richard Posner’s work on pragmatism and legal interpretation offers an example of the form taken by this simplified pragmatism
and the difficulty of meshing it fully with sophisticated accounts of
interpretation. Over the past several decades, Judge Posner has selfconsciously articulated a platform of pragmatic adjudication.125 The
central planks in his platform are context-sensitivity and instrumentalism.126 The pragmatic adjudicator, to Judge Posner, is one who
considers not just legal authorities but all relevant information in
reaching the decisions likely to have the best short- and long-term
consequences.127 For Judge Posner, unlike Judge Clark, pragmatism
does not require distaste for issues of textual meaning. Indeed, Judge
Posner has written extensively on problems in legal interpretation.128
124. See, e.g., Desautels-Stein, supra note 98; Marcus, supra note 66.
125. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 165, 168-69, 198
(2001) [hereinafter POSNER, FRONTIERS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 13-14,
202-03, 345-46 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER, THINK]; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) [hereinafter POSNER, DEMOCRACY]; RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 2-21, 387-405 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOMING];
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 82, 112, 119,
(1999) [hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMATICS]; POSNER, supra note 106, at 14, 108, 192;
Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM, supra note
100, at 235 [hereinafter Posner, Adjudication]; Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law As
an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 763 (1987) [hereinafter
Posner, Decline]; Posner, supra note 106, at 829, 866; Richard A. Posner, Tribute to Ronald
Dworkin and a Note on Pragmatic Adjudication, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9, 9-14
(2007); Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653
(1990) [hereinafter Posner, Offer].
126. Similarly, Thomas Grey defines legal pragmatism as a “practical” orientation
toward law, characterized by a blending of “contextualist and . . . instrumentalist strands
of legal thought” that replicates Jamesian and Deweyan popularized pragmatism. Thomas
C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, in T HE REVIVAL OF P RAGMATISM, supra note
100, at 256. In Grey’s understanding, legal pragmatism is not concerned with questions
of meaning or textual detail; like most proceduralists since Clark, Grey seems to find
legal communications interesting only insofar as they function as means to other ends. See
id. at 254-57.
127. See, e.g., Posner, Adjudication, supra note 125, at 235, 240 (“[T]he positivist starts
with and gives more weight to the authorities, while the pragmatist starts with and gives
more weight to the facts.”); POSNER, THINK, supra note 125, at 202-03; id at 248 (“Good
pragmatic judges balance two types of consequence, the case-specific and the systemic.”).
128. See, e.g., POSNER, THINK, supra note 125, at 113, 193-202. See also, e.g., POSNER,
OVERCOMING, supra note 125, at 155, 199, 215-16; POSNER, supra note 106, at 40, 42, 60;
Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1368-80 (1990); Richard A.
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987); Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the
Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1576 (1969); Richard A.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 800 (1983).
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And in some respects, his account of interpretation recalls Peirce’s. In
a recent book, for example, Judge Posner described interpretation as
a “quintessentially intuitive human faculty,” “not a rule-bound activity,” but rather one based on “experience[, which] creates a repository
of buried knowledge on which intuition can draw when one is faced
with a new interpretandum.”129 While this view seems indebted to
Peirce,130 divorced from Peirce’s broader conceptual framework, this
type of flexible understanding of meaning and interpretation is
vulnerable to criticism as unprincipled and unpredictable.131 And
when pushed, Judge Posner acknowledges the value of “accuracy” in
interpretation, which seems for him to be dependent on a correspondence theory of meaning.132 For Peirce, in contrast, meaning was
by definition principled and predictable, even though it could not
always be known with certainty.
Thus, Judge Posner’s position ultimately seems consistent with
the form of pragmatism adopted by Clark. The difficulty this position
has with issues of interpretation is even more visible in the commentary on Iqbal, reconsidered in the next Section.
3. The Effect on Responses to Iqbal
The commentary discussed in Parts I.B and I.C bears the marks of
Clark’s expressed vision, including his teleological view of pleading
doctrine and the instrumentalist values associated with notice pleading. The responses to Iqbal also share the later pragmatists’ and

129. POSNER, THINK, supra note 125, at 113; see also id. at 193.
130. Judge Posner has never referred to Peirce as an influence on his thinking about
legal interpretation, aside from occasional citation of Peirce as the originator of the idea of
“interpretive community.” See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 106, at 450; Richard A. Posner,
Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline?, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 333,
339 (1988). When he has addressed Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, Judge Posner paraphrases
it as a consequentialist directive: meaning equals effects. See supra note 106. Most often,
he simply refers to Peirce as a founder of pragmatism. See, e.g., POSNER, DEMOCRACY,
supra note 125, at 100-01, 139; POSNER, OVERCOMING, supra note 125, at 388, 396, 450,
459; RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE 231-32 (2008);
POSNER, supra note 106, at 16 n.25, 27, 436 n.17, 450, 462-64; Posner, Decline, supra note
125, at 763; Posner, Offer, supra note 125, at 1654-55; Posner, supra note 106, at 879-80
n.90. Less often, he distinguishes Peirce from the main pragmatist tradition. See, e.g.,
POSNER, DEMOCRACY, supra note 125, at 24-25, 26 n.6.
131. For the classic critique of legal pragmatism along these lines, see, for example,
RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006); Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers,
and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 359 (Michael Brint & William
Weaver eds., 1991).
132. See, e.g., POSNER, THINK, supra note 125, at 198 (“[T]he accuracy of a literal
interpretation of a legislative text is easier to evaluate than the soundness of a pragmatic
interpretation.”). On Judge Posner’s inconsistency on this point, see also Lake, supra note
98, at 564, 578-80, 596-97, 604, 615-16, 618-19, 645, Tibor R. Machan, Posner’s Rortyite
(Pragmatic) Jurisprudence, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 361, 362, 366-68, 375 (1995), and Richard
Rorty, Dewey and Posner on Pragmatism and Moral Progress, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 915, 92023 (2007).
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Clark’s lack of interest in issues of interpretation and the related denial that interpretation should play any role in the pleading process.
Virtually every commentator on Twombly and Iqbal has adopted
Clark’s narrative of the development of pleading doctrine. Many discussions reiterate Clark’s three-phase narrative.133 Some contend that
Twombly and Iqbal signal reversion to the fact pleading regime.134
Others suggest that we have, for better or worse, entered a fourth
post-Clark phase.135 But both positions are faithful to Clark’s basic
story. Commentators also widely endorse Clark’s account of notice
pleading as intended to minimize formalities, increase access, and
facilitate adjudication on the merits.136 Interestingly, it is commentary by judges that comes closest to rejecting Clark’s narrative.137

133. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 57, at 448; Gressette, supra note 54, at 403-11;
Hannon, supra note 54, at 1812-14; Muhammad Umair Khan, Tortured Pleadings: The
Historical Development and Recent Fall of the Liberal Pleadings Standard, 3 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV. 460, 477-81 (2010); Klein, supra note 56, at 474-78; Moline, supra note 57, at 163-77;
Schwartz & Appel, supra note 4, at 1111-21; Subrin, supra note 4, at 378-79; Sullivan,
supra note 3, at 8-17.
134. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 52, at 859-64 (“Iqbal’s novel doctrinal contribution is to
subdivide the pleading analysis formally into two prongs, with the first prong sorting legal
conclusions from factual allegations. . . . The distinction . . . was an important feature of
nineteenth century code pleading, but the Federal Rules . . . eliminated it. . . .”); Halaby,
supra note 2, at 38 (“[F]ederal court plaintiffs and defendants seem destined to rejoin
battle on just what is a mere conclusion, as opposed to a factual allegation[, like] . . . . those
long-departed legions of lawyers whose skirmishes on that front taught us to fight our
procedural battles elsewhere . . . .”); Hartnett, supra note 8, at 486 (admitting “worry
that . . . Twombly means the resurrection of concepts that the drafters of the Federal
Rules . . . thought they had left behind,” namely, “distinctions between evidentiary facts,
ultimate facts, and legal conclusions” that were “crucial to code pleading”); Herrmann,
Beck & Burbank, supra note 52, at 161 (in contribution by Burbank, describing decisions
as imposing “a system of complaint-parsing that is hard to distinguish from that which the
drafters of the Federal Rules explicitly rejected”).
135. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 850 (“[I]t is quite hard to resist the
conclusion that the Justices inadvertently stumbled into a new procedural era.”);
Gressette, supra note 54, at 449-50; Kilaru, supra note 3, at 908; Marcus, supra note 4, at
412; Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split Between Federal
and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 111 (2010); Schwartz & Appel,
supra note 4, at 1110; Spencer, supra note 3, at 368; Smith, supra note 4, at 1055
(describing Iqbal as an “evolution in the pleading standard that is likely to increase the
efficiency and fairness of modern civil practice”); Spencer, supra note 51, at 441-42.
136. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 3, at 111; Coleman, supra note 52, at 285; Jois,
supra note 3, at 901; Miller, supra note 52, at 2; Ryan Mize, Comment, From Plausibility to
Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible Remedies, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2010); Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against (“Settlement”
Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1221 & n.64 (2009); Pocker, supra note 4, at 38;
Rothman, supra note 52, at 2; Spencer, supra note 3, at 354; Spencer, supra note 55, at 2;
Tice, supra note 51, at 833-34; Nicolas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the
Probable: Defining the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 508 (2009).
137. See Kourlis, Singer & Knowlton, supra note 56, at 246 (“The new [Federal Rules]
system was innovative, and the theory behind it reasonable. [But i]n hindsight, . . .
removing the issue-narrowing function [of the common-law system] from pleadings has
proven to be a serious mistake.”); Levin, supra note 57, at 144.
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The majority view of Twombly and Iqbal as disruptions of the
Clark-Conley system has led to confusion about the extent to which
the recent decisions should be considered “pragmatic.” Clark’s narrative is, rightly, closely associated with pragmatism, at least of the
simplified kind described above. Understanding Twombly and Iqbal
as departures from that narrative would seem to entail understanding
them as antipragmatic. And accounts of the decisions that describe
them as harking back to the fact pleading era do indeed describe
them as renouncing a commitment to the pragmatic notice pleading
regime.138 But commentators have also characterized Twombly and
Iqbal as pragmatic decisions, usually in a less positive sense.139 On
this view, the decisions’ pretextual cloaking of policy judgments in
procedural trappings and their conferral of unbounded discretion on
trial court judges reflect and license result-oriented decisionmaking
constrained only by personal preferences.140
This confusion in contemporary applications of the “pragmatic”
label is, in the pleading context, a corollary of the developments
described earlier, especially the habit of denying that the screening of
pleadings has anything to do with considering the language in which
the pleadings are presented, itself the product of a merging of consequentialist policy assessment with correspondence theories of meaning
and truth. In the specific context of twenty-first-century pleading
doctrine, these traditions can help to explain, for example, the widespread misapprehension that the “plausibility” standard requires
plaintiffs to offer “evidentiary support” for their allegations in the
complaint itself.141 Commentators reach this conclusion because they
are conditioned to think of the contents of a complaint not as verbal
propositions, but as directly reflecting or somehow constituting facts
in the world. The same conditioning explains the negative tone used
by most of the commentators who do acknowledge that Twombly and
Iqbal seem to require judges to interpret complaints.142 Stephen
138. See sources cited supra note 134.
139. Judge Posner himself, writing before the Iqbal decision, called Twombly
“pragmatic.” POSNER, THINK, supra note 125, at 53-54; see also Scott Dodson, Justice
Souter and the Civil Rules, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 289, 298 (2010) (calling Twombly
“nonoriginalist and pragmatic”); Tidmarsh, supra note 56, at 407-08 (noting that the
“modern procedural system was built largely on the foundations of Roscoe Pound’s [Realist]
vision” of “a simple, uniform, discretionary, ‘decide each case on its merits’ approach to
legal procedure,” the “deep flaws” of which became evident only over time).
140. See sources cited supra notes 49-52.
141. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 19, at 1328-33 (discussing this trend in reception of
Iqbal). To similar effect are arguments that the standards invade the province of the jury.
See, e.g., Flake, supra note 3, at 992; Kilaru, supra note 3, at 925-26; Spencer, supra note
60, at 199; see also sources cited supra note 50.
142. See, e.g., Burbank, General Rules, supra note 52, at 535 (describing standard as
“invitation to the lower courts to make ad hoc decisions reflecting buried policy choices”);
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 290-91 (“What is plausible and credible to one district judge
is not going to be plausible and credible to another.”); Eichhorn, supra note 52, at 953
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Burbank, for example, has described the “architecture of Iqbal’s mischief
. . . [a]s the power the Court claimed to parse a complaint.”143 Virtually
all of those who have noted Iqbal’s implication that a judge must
interpret a complaint in order to determine its sufficiency similarly
regard this implication as disastrous.144
Only one commentator, Robert Bone, has acknowledged without
panic that Twombly and Iqbal indicate that a judge must interpret a
complaint in order to assess its sufficiency:
The complaint is supposed to give a coherent account of the
relevant events and transactions involved in the dispute.
Therefore, it must be interpreted as a coherent whole, and the
sufficiency of its allegations must be evaluated in a holistic way.
The Twombly Court understood this point clearly. . . . Justice
Souter also understood this fundamental point in his Iqbal dissent.
He interpreted the key allegations in the context of the complaint
as a whole before concluding that the plausibility standard was
met. It follows from the holistic nature of pleading analysis that
(“[B]y drawing on a metaphor of judging-as-measuring, the Court . . . deflects attention
from the unbounded discretion that the opinion grants to judges who will administer that
test.”); Gist, supra note 20, at 1037 (noting that in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a judge “is
simply interpreting what a short plain statement means to him”); Herrmann, Beck &
Burbank, supra note 52, at 161 (Burbank, closing statement) (describing decisions as
imposing “a system of complaint-parsing that is hard to distinguish from that which the
drafters of the Federal Rules explicitly rejected”); Kilaru, supra note 3, at 919-20
(“Twombly and Iqbal give lower courts a tremendous power that they did not have
before. . . . Yet at the same time, the disagreement between Justices Souter and Kennedy
on what constitutes a ‘conclusory’ allegation reveals that the distinction is as manipulable
as it is powerful.”); Miller, supra note 52, at 26 (describing “judicial experience and
common sense” as “highly ambiguous and subjective concepts largely devoid of accepted—
let alone universal—meaning”); Mohan, supra note 52, at 1197 (“The looseness of the Iqbal
test allows for a disparate range of interpretations about what is conclusory and what is
plausible.”); Rothman, supra note 52, at 2 (“Iqbal has the potential to short-circuit the
adversary process by shutting the doors of federal courthouses . . . to . . . legitimate claims
based on what amounts to a district court judge’s effectively irrefutable, subjective
assessment of probable success.”); Allison Sirica, Case Comment, The New Federal
Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), 62 FLA. L. REV. 547, 555
(2010) (noting general consensus of most commentators that the plausibility standard “may
result in highly subjective judgments and inconsistent results among trial courts”); Suja A.
Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1885
(2008) (“[T]he court makes a substantive interpretative judgment [under Twombly] as to
how much evidence is sufficient evidence.”); Tice, supra note 51, at 827 (noting that
Twombly leaves “lower courts and plaintiffs’ lawyers . . . significant leeway to tease out the
meaning of ‘plausibility’ in different contexts”); Capital Report, supra note 47, at 10
(“[Professor] Burbank . . . cautioned that the court’s misguided decision will lead to a
‘whole new brand of mischief’ in which trial judges subjectively dismiss complaints.”).
Although Noll does not take a critical view of “the many interpretative questions the
Court's decision left open,” the questions to which he refers are primarily questions of the
interpretation of Iqbal as precedent, not the interpretation of complaints. Noll, supra note
48, at 117.
143. Burbank, supra note 3, at 115.
144. See sources cited supra note 142; see also, e.g., Peddie, supra note 52, at 54 (noting
criticisms that Iqbal licenses judges to “dismiss complaints that appear implausible based
only on caprice or ‘judicial experience and common sense’ ”).
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there is no conceptual distinction between the two parts of Iqbal’s
two-pronged approach. . . . The reason certain allegations are
conclusory is that the complaint, interpreted with them in it, does
not meet the pleading standard for the legal element the defective
allegations are meant to support.145

Professor Bone is unusual in noting that both Twombly and Iqbal
displayed an understanding that judges engage in the interpretation
of complaints when deciding motions to dismiss. Professor Bone does
not, however, explicitly defend the holistic approach to interpretation
that he endorses. More particularly, he does not explain why we need
not fear that even if all judges considered all pleadings holistically, judges might still reach inconsistent conclusions about their sufficiency.
The combination of acceptance of Clark’s vision of pleading and
this vision’s rejection of the role played by interpretation in the
pleading process further explains the Catch-22 criticism of Iqbal
described above, which depends on the assumption that a plaintiff
cannot allege facts that the plaintiff does not know to be true. It also
explains the judicial discretion critique, which depends on the assumption that the conclusoriness and plausibility of allegations
cannot be assessed on a stable, intersubjective basis but are necessarily subjective and unpredictable. And it explains the legitimacy
critique; most forms of this argument rest on a positivist-style distinction between the judicial interpretation of legal rules (understood
as subjective and hence illegitimate) and legislatively enacted rules
themselves (understood as objective, democratically generated, and
hence legitimate). All of these responses to the Court’s recent pleading decisions have their source in the developments described above.
B. Taking Interpretation Out of Procedure and Putting It Back In
The prevailing understanding of Twombly and Iqbal as pragmatic
in a negative sense because they countenance the interpretation of
complaints is the result of abandonment of Peirce’s concern with
meaning in the popularization of pragmatism. The disappearance of
this concern from the vocabularies of, first, popularized pragmatism
and then twentieth-century proceduralism was not inevitable, but it
was probably overdetermined. The reappearance of the concern now
is cause not for distress, but for optimism.

145. Bone, supra note 52, at 868-69. Cf. Hartnett, supra note 8, at 498 (“The need to
rely on experience and common sense in drawing inferences is hardly radical—it is a staple
of inductive reasoning, which in turn is at the heart of our system of adjudication.”); Miller,
supra note 57, at 1005 (observing that Iqbal “lays bare both the fact that pleading doctrine
is a form of ‘choice architecture’ and that the materials used to build that architecture are
seriously, and ineluctably, deficient,” and describing Iqbal as “one of the unusual cases that
expose the meager and borrowed nature of the materials with which we build this
architecture,” namely, language).
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1. Why the Avoidance of Interpretation?
Is pragmatism compatible with an understanding of interpretation that is not uselessly subjective and instrumentalist? Peirce’s
ideas suggest that it is. The turn away from Peirce’s understanding
of interpretation resulted mainly not from the incoherence of that
understanding but from developments in the twentieth-century academy, including the legal academy.
As noted above, James and Dewey, like Clark, mostly regarded
issues of signification, meaning, and interpretation as at best trivial
and at worst dangerous.146 The dyadic, correspondence-based conception of meaning to which they sometimes resorted precluded an understanding of verbal meaning, and interpretation, as intersubjective
and thus stable and predictable, even if not mechanically produced. A
dualistic conception of meaning (one that identifies a good interpretation as involving an interpreter’s “matching” a particular sign to its
referent or to the intention with which it was produced) reduces each
instance of interpretation to an individual act of judgment. Such a
conception cannot account for why different interpreters might be
expected to form consistent judgments, or interpretants. Peirce’s
account of signification as a three-part phenomenon embedded in a
three-aspect reality, in contrast, tied meaning to the most basic
structures of regularity in general; thirdness, for Peirce, was the
realm not just of signification but also of natural laws and habit.147
For him, perceiving meaning was just one way of tapping into preexisting regularity. The possibility of meaningfulness, in Peirce’s view,
precedes perceptions of regularity and makes such perceptions possible. While different individuals may, due to divergent experiences,
perceive different aspects of this regularity when they interpret
signs, on Peirce’s theory, it should usually be possible to mediate between differing judgments by enlarging the interpreters’ frames of
reference. Despite their interests in pluralism, James and Dewey left
all of these notions behind when they introduced pragmatism—in the
sense of a concern with practical engagement and effectiveness—to
the wider public. In the process, pragmatism lost its foundation in a
positive intersubjective conception of stable meaning.

146. See supra notes 109-23 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Vincent Colapietro, Habit, Competence, and Purpose: How to Make the
Grades of Clarity Clearer, 45 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y. 348, 355
(2009); Marjorie C. Miller, Peirce’s Conception of Habit, in PEIRCE’S DOCTRINE OF SIGNS:
THEORY, APPLICATIONS, AND CONNECTIONS 71, 74 (Vincent M. Colapietro & Thomas M.
Olshewsky eds., 1996) (“[H]abit, as a tendency to act, is generality-in-the-making, the
mediation between first and second which is the institution of a third.”); Richard Rorty,
Pragmatism, Categories, and Language, 70 PHIL. REV. 197, 210 (1961) (noting that “[s]ign”
and “[h]abit” were for Peirce “two of the most important sobriquets of thirdness”).
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After pragmatism was popularized, its influence on American
academic philosophy waned, making revival of Peirce’s perspective
increasingly unlikely in that forum. Through the mid-twentieth century, the philosophical study of meaning returned mostly to analysis
of the kind Peirce had criticized.148 The neopragmatist revival in the
American academy of the 1980s was mainly a revival of Deweyan
pragmatism and thus did not lead academics directly back to
Peirce.149 Although they were nominally concerned with “interpretation,” pragmatist revivalists generally approached the topic from the
more dyadic perspective of hermeneutics.150
Independent of any strictly philosophical influences, legal commentary on the subject of interpretation developed along parallel
lines. Throughout the entire period addressed by this Article, such
commentary has been preoccupied with figuring out how meanings in
general—and legal meaning in particular—can be made stable and
predictably effective. Typical of many twentieth-century approaches
to these issues was the perspective advanced by Peirce’s contemporary
James Bradley Thayer, who denigrated judicial interpretation as a
mechanical exercise unsuited for important political decisionmaking.151 Thayer’s position was echoed in legal realists’ critiques of the
rhetoric associated with legal interpretation, especially statutory
interpretation, in the early twentieth century.152 Over the next hundred
years, the most visible and influential work on legal interpretation
never stopped puzzling over the question of whether interpretive discretion, and interpretation itself, were inimical to law or synonymous
with it.153
In the area of civil procedure, as described above, legal academics
quickly accepted the Dewey-Clark vision of pragmatism, which left
no room for the operation of interpretation within procedure. After
1938, academic proceduralists seeking to justify their scholarship as
having some significance for the real world of litigation shifted their
focus from the pre-Rules concern with formalities to a Clark-style
148. The wartime influx of European émigrés into American philosophy departments
shifted the center of gravity of academic philosophy toward the kind of conceptual analysis
that the classic pragmatists had combated. For a general discussion, see SHORT, supra note
103, at 91-144, 263-346.
149. See supra note 102.
150. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990).
151. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 138 (1893).
152. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory
Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory
of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) [hereinafter Llewellyn, 1950]; K. N. Llewellyn, The Constitution
as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).
153. See, e.g., Karen Petroski, Does It Matter What We Say About Legal Interpretation?,
43 MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
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emphasis on individual outcomes and system-wide effects.154 Debates
about procedure, and pleading in particular, tended to turn on disagreements about which systemic effects to promote and the best
devices for promoting them.155 The same focus is visible throughout
the commentary on Iqbal, including commentary taking a less critical
view of the decision.156 This consistency is understandable. Proceduralists today continue to face disincentives to think of trial court judges
as interpreters of complaints. If interpretation is conceived in dyadic
terms, it seems inherently unstable, so acknowledging its role in the
screening of claims for litigation can seem to concede the futility of
any procedural recommendations directed at rationally governing
subsequent stages of a lawsuit. Few procedural commentators are
likely to be eager to imply the irrelevance of their recommendations
in this way.
The result of all of these developments is the scenario we face following Iqbal: one in which judges appear to recognize the role of
interpretation in screening pleadings, either explicitly or implicitly,
but in which neither they nor commentators have access to a vocabulary for communicating this recognition positively.
2. What If We Did Not Avoid the Issue?
Perhaps James, Dewey, and Clark were right to turn away from
Peirce’s concern with interpretation. Does it not just complicate
things unnecessarily? No; in fact, there might be much to gain from
considering the similarities (and differences) between the scrutiny of
pleadings and other forms of legal interpretation. First, as Iqbal indicates, judges already recognize these similarities, even if only implicitly. Any account of the treatment of pleadings that does not
acknowledge the similarities is therefore descriptively incomplete.
Second, although the main approach to legal interpretation in other
areas has been dyadic and subjectivist, a more Peircean conception
has persisted alongside that prevailing view. We thus have familiar
grounds for acknowledging the place of interpretation in procedure in
a way that does not open the door to radical unpredictability. Third,
if these first two points are granted, the scholarly literature and
doctrine pertaining to the interpretation of other kinds of legal texts
offers a vast resource for ideas about how Twombly and Iqbal should
and will be implemented.
First, the analysis suggested by Iqbal requires the interpretation
of complaints in a sense that differs from the mainstream understanding of that activity, but that is consistent with what has always
154. See supra notes 84-86, 106, and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 52, 58, and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.

454

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:417

occurred on motions to dismiss.157 From close up—when one studies
complaints, or orders on motions to dismiss, one at a time, focusing
on the legal standards cited and the reasons given for judicial conclusions—it is not always easy to see how similarly district court judges
treat complaints and other legal texts. This is not a new practice.158
Most district court orders on motions to dismiss, both before and after
Twombly and Iqbal, include extensive quotations from complaints,
often in quantities far exceeding quotations from legal authority.159
Quotations from complaints anchor orders in the details of cases, just
as quotations from precedent anchor them in the law. Further, over
time, complaint text handled in this way takes on properties of legal
authority. As later orders on motions to dismiss cite previous orders,
the new orders sometimes include in their citations the previous orders’ quotations from complaints.160 Material that originally appeared
in a complaint can thus be transformed from litigants’ allegations
into legally significant formulations, causing the distinction between
factual allegations and legal conclusions to shift or even disappear.161
Considered in this way, judicial practice on motions to dismiss has
always involved interpretation not just in the subjectivist sense but
also in the Peircean sense: it has involved the generation of new
signs (orders ruling on motions to dismiss) marking the emergence of
“interpretants” out of judges’ (and parties’) encounters with those
signs we refer to as complaints (as well as briefing and arguments), and
giving rise to new instances of interpretation. The patterns in communication and behavior constituted and revealed by such practices
are the patterns of meaningfulness recognized in complaints. They
157. The assertions contained in the rest of this paragraph are based the author’s
original study of 136 district court orders from July 2006, 2008, and 2009 issued in the
Southern District of New York (the district of origin of Twombly) and in the Eastern
District of New York (the district of origin of Iqbal) deciding 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motions. The
list of orders considered was generated by a Westlaw search on the term “12(b)(6)” in the
relevant periods and districts (orders mentioning 12(b)(6) motions without deciding one
were discarded). The number of orders examined per year and district was, for 2006, 41
orders, 15 from the Eastern District of New York (E.D.N.Y.) and 26 from the Southern
District of New York (S.D.N.Y.); for 2008, 47 orders, 16 from the E.D.N.Y. and 31 from the
S.D.N.Y.; and for 2009, 48 orders, 11 from the E.D.N.Y. and 37 from the S.D.N.Y..
158. Before Twombly, courts sometimes cited authority referring to the “construal” and
“interpretation” of pleadings, especially pro se pleadings. See, e.g., Roth ex rel. Beacon
Power Corp. v. Perseus, L.L.C., No. 05 Civ. 10466 (RPP), 2006 WL 2129331 (S.D.N.Y. July
31, 2006). In this context, however, “interpreting” a pleading sometimes amounted to a
confession that the court would be exercising its judgment regarding the meaning of a
complaint, reflecting the subjective conception of interpretation held by Clark.
159. Only nine of the 136 orders studied include no citations to the plaintiff’s
complaint. Several of these exceptions extensively cite and quote other dispositive
documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.
160. See, e.g., Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Bank of Am., N.A., 646 F. Supp. 2d 489
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
161. This possibility is reminiscent of Cook’s argument that what counts as “legal
language” is not static but shifts as legal professionals’ practices change. See supra notes
75-82 and accompanying text.
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are also the content of what Justice Kennedy called district court
judges’ “experience and common sense” with respect to civil complaints.162 Indeed, rather than licensing courts to decide motions to
dismiss any way they wish, Iqbal seems simply to have inspired district court judges and their clerks to find new (yet still recognizable)
ways to describe the regularities that this process involves.163
Second, as this discussion suggests, recognizing that the screening
of pleadings involves their interpretation does not require us to consider the process unstable. Justice Kennedy’s reference in Iqbal to
“experience and common sense” as an aspect of the legal standard
may suggest that he, at least, considers interpretation to be a stable
enough process to function as such.164 (And in other areas of law, we
are willing to accept legal standards that include interpretation as a
component, one of the best known being the Chevron standard, discussed below.) Although Justice Souter disagreed with Justice Kennedy’s understanding of Iqbal’s complaint, Justice Souter appeared to
share Justice Kennedy’s assumption on this point; like Professor
Bone,165 Justice Souter presented his own reading of the complaint as
the one that should strike more readers as correct (and if Peirce is
right, then the “holistic” approach recommended by Justice Souter
and Professor Bone is a more accurate description of how verbal and
legal meaning arise).166 Both approaches resemble Judge Posner’s
and are aligned with the most sophisticated contemporary accounts
of legal interpretation. These accounts acknowledge—as did Peirce
and his contemporary Holmes167—that while interpretation is not a
mechanical process and may involve some variation, intersubjective
practices do limit it, making some assertions about meaning more
defensible than others.168 The growing interest in using empirical
methods to examine issues of interpretation is based on similar
premises.169 This perspective on interpretation does not assume that
all regularity is best explained in terms of mechanical compulsion
(Peirce’s secondness); it allows that some regularity may occur

162. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
163. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
164. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
165. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
166. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960-61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
167. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417,
417 (1899).
168. Much work in this vein is influenced by LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1953), and a good sample is the collection LAW
AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).
169. For a recent example, see FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2009). An early qualitative version of this approach was
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
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through a more complex process that we can describe only from a
more distant point of view (Peirce’s thirdness).170
Finally, if the scrutiny of complaints has always involved interpretation, and if this need not mean that the process is a free-for-all,
then we should be able to look to thought about the interpretation of
other kinds of legal texts to understand what courts are doing in the
wake of Twombly and Iqbal, and to identify useful models for the
analysis of particular complaints or types of complaints. The literature on legal interpretation offers a rich resource for the analysis of
pleading practice. The final Part of this Article explores some of the
ways this material might usefully orient discussion of how Iqbal
should be implemented.
IV. PLEADING SCRUTINY AS A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
Pleading scrutiny has always been a matter of interpretation: a
matter of finding legal significance in a text and basing conclusions
about legal action on reasons drawn from that text. Iqbal has merely
made this fact more difficult to deny than it previously was. In addition, of course, the Iqbal opinions also present specific principles for
courts to use in scrutinizing complaints: the recommendation that
courts decline to extend the presumption of truth to conclusory allegations, and the Twombly-derived requirement that nonconclusory
allegations plausibly suggest a claim to relief.171 If pleading scrutiny
(under Iqbal as before) is a matter of interpretation, it should be
possible to clarify application of these principles using resources
drawn from other legal interpretation contexts. This Part explores,
first, how the conclusoriness standard might be illuminated by ideas
about gap-filling in contract law and superfluity in statutory and contractual interpretation, and then how work on judicial deference to
administrative agency interpretations might help us to think critically
about the plausibility standard in a structured way.
A. Conclusoriness, Gap-Filling, and Superfluity
As noted, Justice Kennedy’s reference in Iqbal to the treatment of
“legal conclusions” is reminiscent of the early twentieth-century
“statement of facts” debate.172 But resuming this debate, without
more, is unlikely to resolve all of our questions about how the conclusoriness principle should be implemented. This Section considers two
concepts developed to address parallel issues that arise in the interpretation of other kinds of legal texts: the concepts of filling gaps in

170. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
171. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; see also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 75-82, 134, and accompanying text.
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incomplete contracts and of avoiding superfluities in statutory as
well as contractual text.
1. Gap-Filling
Complaints have some unexpected functional similarities to contracts. Like complaints, contracts are drafted by individual parties—
usually not by government bodies—to address particular situations.
Also like complaints, they establish and articulate a relation between
(at least) two parties. To be sure, most contracts purport to coordinate relations, and every complaint implies a coordination breakdown. But this distinction may be less fundamental than it first
seems. In a sense, complaints initiate something like a contractual
relationship; indeed, they trigger a process that often results in a
formal contractual agreement. They sometimes function just as much
like contractual offers as like declarations of war. Further, on most
accounts, contract law over the past century has largely discarded
those doctrines based on concepts of mutual intent that seem most
inapplicable to the civil pleading context.173 Questions of contract interpretation are basically questions of the legal effect to be given to
documents created by private persons, and in this they are much like
questions of pleading sufficiency.
When a contract is silent on an issue, a court asked to enforce the
contract as to that issue must decide how to resolve it without guidance from contract language. Many, though not all, commentators
consider such a decision to be a kind of interpretive question; whether or not it is labeled interpretive, the decision does concern the significance the court will give to the contract.174 Much of the commentary on the standards for justifying such decisions evaluates existing
legal default rules that function to fill such gaps in contract language, identifies the systemic effects of such rules, and recommends
new default rules to address recurring forms of contractual silence.175
A conclusory allegation resembles a contractual gap. At least in
theory, such an allegation reproduces the words of a legal standard
but lacks any language linking the standard to the plaintiff’s specific
circumstances. Justice Kennedy’s Iqbal opinion suggests that when
faced with such a gap, a judge should not fill it, but should, rather,

173. See, e.g., Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract
Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 477 (2000).
174. See, e.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of
Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991).
175. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992). For a critical
assessment, see W. David Slawson, The Futile Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 29 (1994).
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impose a penalty on the conclusory drafter.176 Yet neither Twombly
nor Iqbal mandates such a penalty default rule. Neither decision, for
instance, expressly disapproved Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84,
which provides that, “The forms in the Appendix [to the Rules] suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that
these rules contemplate.”177 One of these form pleadings, Form 11,
contains an apparently conclusory allegation of negligence: “On
<Date>, at <Place>, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle
against the plaintiff.”178 To the extent this Form includes a “gap”
concerning the nature of the defendant’s negligence, courts seem to
remain authorized to fill it.
In Iqbal, however, Justice Kennedy declined to fill the gaps in Iqbal’s complaint relating to Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s discriminatory
state of mind.179 Which gaps, then, should a court fill in a complaint?
In the contract context, arguments about optimal gap-filling rules
have focused largely on the types of recurring situations in which
contracts tend to contain gaps and on the systemic consequences of
resolving that silence in favor of particular types of parties—
particularly consequences relating to incentives to provide information in the process of contract formation.180 Taking a similar
approach in the complaint context would require us to identify the
types of situations in which complaints tend to contain conclusory
allegations and the consequences of reading these allegations out of
complaints or, instead, filling these “gaps” to plaintiffs’ benefit.
Commentators have already begun to do this, suggesting, for example, that allegations of corporate or governmental motive, especially
in discrimination and civil-rights suits, are more likely than others to
be necessarily conclusory, since plaintiffs will lack access to the information they need in order to be more specific.181 But there is a
need for further systematic work in this area.182
176. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
177. FED. R. CIV. P. 84.
178. Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 11. The website for the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts continues to offer the Appendix Forms, including Form 11, as downloadable
document templates. The website notes, “[g]iven their nature, language in these forms may
require modification before the document can be filed with the court. Red font is used to
draw attention to these instances.” Illustrative Civil Rules Forms, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulesAndForms/Illustrative
CivilRulesForms.aspx (last accessed Nov. 18, 2011).
179. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 174-75.
181. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 55, at 32-35.
182. Such work could, for example, gather information about the types of cases in
which complaints tend to contain conclusory allegations (that is allegations repeating
legal standards verbatim) to determine when, in fact, gaps may be inevitable, thus
identifying the kinds of claims in which gap-filling in the plaintiff’s favor should at least be
considered. It could also consider the relative costs imposed on defendants by various
kinds of conclusory allegations and the corresponding relative costs to plaintiffs and third
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This approach to the analysis of “conclusoriness” has limits. In
particular, some instances of putatively conclusory language may not
lend themselves to description as “gaps.” The difference of opinion
between Justices Kennedy and Souter in Iqbal, for instance, was
more a disagreement about whether the Court should create gaps in
Iqbal’s complaint than one about whether the Court should fill any
gaps: Justice Kennedy concluded that some of Iqbal’s allegations
relating to Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s states of mind should be disregarded. From this perspective, the theoretical-doctrinal analogy more
suited to the analysis of conclusoriness might be the rules against
“superfluities” in the interpretation of contracts and statutes.
2. The Rule Against Superfluities
One of many maxims used to guide and justify judicial interpretations of statutory law, the “rule against superfluities” in that context
is based on the polite fiction that a legislature does nothing without a
purpose183 and the more basic “cardinal rule that statutory language
must be read in context [since] a phrase gathers meaning from the
words around it.”184 Also called the “rule against redundancy”185 and
the “rule against surplusage,”186 this principle parallels an analogous
rule in contract interpretation187 and directs courts to, where possible, give statutory text an effect that does not render any words of
the text meaningless—to construe each statute “so that no part will
be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”188 A similar principle justifies the “whole act rule,” which “directs that ‘[w]hen “interpreting a statute, the court will look not merely to a particular
clause . . . but will . . . give to [the whole statute] such a construction
as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature.” ’ ”189
Justice Souter’s dissent in Iqbal cites none of these maxims, but
his analysis of Iqbal’s complaint is animated by the principle underlying them (and underlying Peirce’s, Judge Posner’s, and Professor

parties of failing to have gaps resolved in their favor, costs that would vary with the type of
claim involved.
183. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 258 (2000) (citing Kungys v. United
States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988)).
184. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citing General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596 (2004); 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
46.06, pp. 181-86 (6th rev. ed. 2000)).
185. Gutierrez, 528 U.S. at 258.
186. Cf. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) (citing Chickasaw Nation v. United
States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001)).
187. See sources cited infra note 194.
188. Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (quoting 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, pp. 181-86 (6th rev. ed. 2000)).
189. Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Kokozka v.
Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857))).
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Bone’s respective understandings of interpretation), that is, the idea
that meaning arises holistically rather than atomistically:
[The allegations discarded by Justice Kennedy as not plausibly
suggesting a claim to relief] do not stand alone as the only significant,
nonconclusory statements in the complaint, for the complaint contains
many allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller to the discriminatory practices of their subordinates. . . . The fallacy of the majority’s
position . . . lies in looking at the relevant assertions in isolation.”190

Justice Souter’s Twombly opinion exhibits a similar concern with
testing meaning—in that opinion, the meanings of Conley and Rule
8(a)(2)—by reference to context.191
Justice Kennedy’s analysis of Iqbal’s complaint, in contrast, appears to violate the principle. The maxim is not an absolute rule;
even Justice Souter has recognized that “as one rule of construction
among many, . . . the rule against redundancy does not necessarily
have the strength to turn a tide of good cause to come out the other
way.”192 But ordinarily, a judge offers some alternative justification
for an interpretation of a text that renders some of its language inoperative. Justice Kennedy offers no such justification in his Iqbal
opinion. He merely lists the allegations he deems conclusory and
observes their linguistic similarity to legal standards.193 Nor does he
explain why principles of holistic interpretation—which are not limited doctrinally to statutory interpretation, but are also observed in
the interpretation of contracts194—would not apply in the context of
interpreting complaints.
More consistent with these familiar principles is the approach of
the Ninth Circuit in its decision in Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft.195 Like Iqbal,
this case involved claims against John Ashcroft, among others, arising out of the plaintiff’s detention in the period following September
11. Abdullah al-Kidd, however, was detained not for immigration
violations but under the federal material witness statute,196 and he
asserted claims for direct violation of that statute as well as for violations of his constitutional rights.197 In considering the sufficiency of
al-Kidd’s complaint under the Twombly-Iqbal standard, the Ninth
Circuit did not detach “bare [legal] allegations” resembling those in
Iqbal’s complaint from other, more concrete allegations, but consid190. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1960 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
191. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
192. Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 258 (2000).
193. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
194. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Wixen, 555 N.W.2d 640, 644-45 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996);
Honulik v. Town of Greenwich, 963 A.2d 979, 987 (2009)).
195. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc denied, 598 F.3d
1129 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 415 (Oct. 18, 2010).
196. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006).
197. See Al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 955-56.
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ered the cumulative effect of all these allegations taken together.198
The court expressly rejected as “hypertechnical” a “reading” of the
complaint urged by Ashcroft in his motion to dismiss and involving a
disjunctive, allegation-by-allegation analysis akin to Justice Kennedy’s
in Iqbal.199
Al-Kidd supplies further reason to think that courts do, indeed,
approach the interpretation of complaints much as they approach the
interpretation of other legal instruments, and that they will continue
to do so under Iqbal. While the canons of statutory and contract construction, including the rule against superfluities, are not without
their own uncertainties,200 acknowledging the relevance of at least
linguistic canons to the interpretation of complaints can only advance
the clarity, stability, and legitimacy of that practice.
B. Plausibility and Deference
When commentators note that Twombly and Iqbal appear to require judges to engage in interpretation, they are usually referring
not to the conclusoriness standard but to the plausibility standard
introduced by Twombly and reaffirmed by Iqbal.201 The recognition
that plausibility is “a matter of interpretation,” for many, seems to
lead directly to the conclusion that there can be no regularity to trial
courts’ assessments of complaints against this standard. A few skeptics have investigated whether the new standards actually have
made outcomes on motions to dismiss more lopsided or unpredictable.
Conclusions vary, but most of the evidence suggests that decisional
patterns have not changed radically, with the possible exception of
civil rights actions.202
The idea that district court judges are likely to conform their postto their pre-Iqbal practices is borne out by those judges’ articulations
of the relevant legal standards in their orders on motions to dismiss.
The same study discussed above to illustrate how courts have been
198. Id. at 975-76.
199. Id. at 975 n.24 (“The paragraph alleging outright violations of § 3144 begins with
‘the post-9/11 policies and practices,’ with the definite article. (Emphasis added). There is
no reason from the text of the complaint to think that those ‘post-9/11 policies and
practices’ are anything other than ‘The post-9/11 material witness policies and practices
adopted and implemented by Defendant Ashcroft’ alleged fourteen paragraphs earlier in the
complaint. (Emphasis added).”).
200. For skeptical accounts of the canons, see, for example, James J. Brudney & Corey
Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (2005); Llewellyn, 1950, supra note 152.
201. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 54; see also, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do
Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010); Joe S. Cecil et
al, Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf.
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treating complaints as texts revealed interesting regularities in
courts’ presentation of their statements of the applicable legal standard.203 After Twombly, judges in the Southern and Eastern Districts
of New York largely stopped referring to the Conley “no set of facts”
formula, as would be expected, but these judges did not stop reciting
the related standards regarding the assumed truth of allegations and
the drawing of all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Alongside these
standards, however, and sometimes in place of them, these judges
started to explain the relation of “plausibility” to existing legal
standards.204 After Iqbal, judges stopped referring to the assumed
truth of the plaintiff’s allegations and began defining plausibility as a
matter of the inferences reasonably supported by the allegations in a
complaint, rather than as a territory separated by a boundary from
other standards.205 Without necessarily noting this detail of district
court practice, commentators have also been tending to equate plausibility with reasonableness.206
If the assessment of plausibility requires both interpretation of a
text and an assessment of the reasonableness of the inferences that
text supports, then we might usefully look to other situations in
which judges must assess the reasonable inferences suggested by an
203. Only two of the 136 orders in the sample contain no statement of a legal standard.
Before Twombly, orders did tend to cite the Conley “no set of facts” standard and the
related principles that the court should accept all allegations as true and draw all
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Yet occasionally, even pre-Twombly orders cited
standards resembling the Iqbal conclusoriness standard. See, e.g., Koleanikov v. Johnson,
No. CV-05-05206, 2006 WL 2095859 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2006); cf., Chapdelaine Corp. Sec.
& Co. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., No. 05 Civ. 10711 (SAS), 2006 WL 2020950, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2006) (“[A] complaint ‘[may] not be dismissed on the ground that it is
conclusory or fails to allege facts.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Initial Public
Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
204. Some such references focus on the difference between “plausibility” and a
“conceivable” or “possible” standard and/or the difference between plausibility and
heightened fact pleading; others cite the Twombly reference to allegations “nudg[ing]” the
plaintiff’s claim across the line from conceivable to plausible. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of
New York, No. 07 Civ. 01991(PKC), 2008 WL 2971772, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2008);
Flaherty v. All Hampton Limousine, Inc., No. 02-CV-4801 (DRH) (WDW), 2008 WL
2788171, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2008).
205. The Iqbal statement that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1951, 1949
(2009) (emphasis added), appears in 21 of the 37 2009 S.D.N.Y. orders and 10 of the 11
2009 E.D.N.Y. orders referenced supra, note 150. In addition, references to “judicial
experience and common sense,” nonexistent before Iqbal, have become numerous after the
opinion. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Westlaw assigned no headnote to this part of the
Iqbal opinion, but cases regularly cite to it. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, No. 07CV-5290 (JS) (ETB), 2009 WL 5255327, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009); Adelphia Recovery
Trust v. Bank of Am., N.A., 646 F. Supp. 2d 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
206. See, e.g., Huston, supra note 54, at 435 (“[J]udges are . . . likely to read
‘plausibility’ as imposing something like a requirement that a complaint’s well-pled facts
‘reasonably’ show a claim to relief.”); Pardo, supra note 8, at 1455 (“[A] complaint is
‘plausible’ if it presents an explanation of the relevant events that a reasonable jury may
be able to accept as the best available explanation.”).
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interpreted text to find hints of how Iqbal may and should be implemented. In a sense, this question does look like the question facing a
judge asked to decide, on a motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, what inferences a reasonable jury could
draw from the evidence.207 But those procedural questions do not require the judge to focus analysis on a discrete text, as most motions
to dismiss do. When this aspect of the Iqbal standard is considered,
an equally valid analogy might be to the standard for judicial review
of agency interpretations of statutory law, as articulated by the
Supreme Court in its 1984 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC decision.208
That standard, like Iqbal, involves two steps. In each setting, the
first step requires analysis of a text (in Chevron, to determine whether
statutory text clearly speaks to the issue. and in Iqbal, to determine
whether a complaint contains conclusory allegations). The second
step involves assessing the reasonableness of inferences from the
same text (in Chevron, determining whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable,209 and in Iqbal, whether the allegations plausibly
state a claim).
The Chevron standard is, of course, controversial in its own
right.210 The past two decades have seen debate on every detail of the
standard: when it applies,211 whether its application makes any difference to the decision of disputes,212and how the two steps relate to
207. This is the approach Professor Pardo takes to reconciling pleading standards with
other dispositive civil procedural standards. See Pardo, supra note 8.
208. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The well-known formulation reads: “First . . . is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court . . . must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute. . . . Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous . . . ,
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.” Id. at 842-43.
209. The Court repeatedly described step two as a “reasonableness” inquiry in the
Chevron decision itself. See id. at 845, 863, 865, 866; id. at 844 (“[A] court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.”).
210. The Chevron doctrine is among the most-commented-upon statutory
interpretation topics. As of March 6, 2011, the case had been cited in 8,200 scholarly
articles; by comparison, as of the same date, Conley had been cited in only 1,865 articles—
even though Conley was decided twenty-seven years earlier.
211. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
212. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial
Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental
Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767 (2008); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations
from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (exploring a variety of forms taken by
deference to agency interpretations in Supreme Court opinions); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding
Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 53 (1998) (finding no relationship between asserted
interpretive method and conclusions of ambiguity at step one); Note, “How Clear Is Clear”
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one another (as well as whether they are even distinct).213 These
questions parallel those debated in the commentary on Twombly and
Iqbal: namely, whether their standards apply to all cases, whether
those standards will make a difference to outcomes, and how the
standards should be applied in particular cases.214 But the parallels
do not extend to the terms in which these issues are considered in
each context. In the Chevron setting, the emphasis is on basic issues
of legal interpretation: On what interpretive issues is a federal judge
more likely to reach a defensible conclusion than an administrative
agency? By what standards should the defensibility of an interpretation be judged? When should a court conclude it has an obligation to
defer to a party’s account of what a text means? In the pleading setting, so far, no similar questions have been considered. Rather, most
commentators seem to assume that no standards for assessing the
defensibility of interpretive conclusions exist, so that implementation
of Iqbal must be evaluated in terms of outcomes alone, without reference to the matter presented in complaints.
Reluctance to use Chevron as a model for thinking about pleading
scrutiny may stem from the apparently divergent presumptions and
policies underlying the two standards. Chevron is widely understood
as a principle of deference justified on separation-of-powers
grounds.215 The plausibility standard, in contrast, is regarded as a
reversal of Conley’s pleader-favoring presumption.216 These presumptions, however, are explicit components of only the second step of
each standard. In the Chevron context, courts do not extend the presumption of deference to their analysis of the text alone.217 This practice provides at least an analytic model for assessing conclusoriness
free of any presumptions about the sufficiency of a pleading. Moreover,
to the extent that both the second step of Chevron and the plausibility standard rest on the assessment of reasonable inferences, Chevron supplies a framework for arguments moderating the apparently
plaintiff-unfriendly presumption of the pleading standard. Just as
reasonableness in the Chevron context is assessed against the backdrop of assumptions about legislative delegation and agency experin Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1687, 1708 (2005) (“[A]part from a very few
cases, there seems to be no rhyme or reason to whether a court is deferential or active at
Step One.”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned
Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 94-95
& n.69 (1994).
213. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step,
95 VA. L. REV. 597, 598 (2009) (“[J]udges, scholars, and teachers . . . should . . .
acknowledge that Chevron calls for a single inquiry into the reasonableness of the agency’s
statutory interpretation.”).
214. See supra Parts II.A and II.B.
215. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-45.
216. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 51, 52, and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 212, at 53; Note, supra note 212, at 1708.
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tise, so should reasonableness in the pleading context be assessed
against the delegation model inherent in the party-driven adversary
system erected by the Federal Rules and the related assumption of
the parties’ expertise with respect to factual questions.
More generally, there is no reason to think it would be any more
difficult to conceive of standards for the interpretation of complaints
than it is to conceive of standards for the interpretation of statutes.
The assumption to the contrary is an artifact of Clark’s vision of civil
pleading. We might make real progress if we admitted the limits of
this vision and again candidly confronted district courts’ inevitably
interpretive task in screening pleadings, as Iqbal prompts us to.
V. CONCLUSION
Understanding Iqbal fully requires us to reexamine the story we
have told for nearly a century about the development of civil pleading
doctrine. An early twentieth-century invention, that story takes
pleading review in its best and most advanced form to have nothing
to do with the close scrutiny of text. Iqbal has discomfited so many
mainly because this story, the source of the present-day vocabulary
for discussing civil pleading, encouraged an impoverished conceptualization of the treatment of civil complaints. But the story’s grip on us
is largely a matter of historical contingencies, not its fundamental
accuracy. From this perspective, Iqbal might indeed have turned
back the pleading clock, but in so doing, it has also reinvigorated
important concepts that lawyers of past generations correctly perceived as lying close to the core of pragmatic thought and standard
understandings of civil pleading. Effective reform of civil pleading
practices requires confronting these issues, not denying them, and we
have all the tools we need to get started on the task.
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